CHAPTER 63

SECURITY VETTING POLICY

(Sponsor: NAVY PSYA-PERS SY Hd)

CONTENTS

SECTION 1 - PERSONNEL SECURITY VETTING

Para
6301. Introduction
6302. Content
6303. Scope

SECTION 2 - SECURITY VETTING PROCEDURES WITHIN THE ROYAL NAVY: REQUIREMENTS, RESPONSIBILITIES AND PRINCIPLES

6304. Security Vetting - The Royal Navy Requirement
6305. Developed Vetting
6306. Aftercare
6307. Security Vetting – Personal Responsibility
6308. Principle 1 - Transparency
6309. Principle 2 - Proportionality
6310. Principle 3 - Confidentiality
6311. Principle 4 - Timeliness

SECTION 3 - SECURITY CLEARANCES AND WAIVERS

6312. Authority
6313. Clearances
6314. Eligibility and Restrictions
6315. Reactivating, Transferring and Sharing Clearances
6316. Temporary Clearance Action

SECTION 4 - ADDITIONAL CHECKS MADE PRIOR TO APPOINTMENT

6317. Loan/Local Foreign Service (LFS) Appointments
6318. International Loan/Exchange Personnel - Security Clearance
6319. Security - Partners Across Government (PAG) Screening
6320. SAP/SPECAP (Intentionally Blank)
6321. STRAP and Nationality

SECTION 5 - VETTING MANAGEMENT AND DECISION MAKING

6322. Continuous Vetting Management
6323. Vetting Decision Making
6324. Suspension and Lapsing of a Security Clearance
6325. Vetting Aftercare
6326. Assignment Restrictions (AR)

SECTION 6 - PROCEDURES FOR APPEALS AGAINST VETTING DECISIONS

6327. Internal Appeal
6328. External Appeals - Procedures for Review by the Security Vetting Appeals Panel (SVAP)
6329. Discharge Policy
6330. Welfare of Vetting Subject - SCART

SECTION 7 - SECURITY VETTING PROCEDURES – INDIVIDUAL AND CHAIN OF COMMAND RESPONSIBILITIES

6331. Individual and Chain of Command Responsibilities

ANNEXES

Annex 63A: Residency Requirements for Naval Service Recruits
Appendix 63A1: Candidate Vetting Flowchart
Appendix 63A2: Criteria for Considering Applications for Residency Waivers
Annex 63B: Formal Security (Drug Misuse) Warning

CHAPTER 63

SECURITY VETTING POLICY

SECTION 1

PERSONNEL SECURITY VETTING

6301. Introduction

a. The Defence Manual of Security - JSP 440 emphasises the need for a systematic vetting regime to manage the issue and withdrawal of national security clearances and to facilitate effective security risk management. The following Sections outline the principles and procedures that govern security vetting within the Royal Navy to enable those personnel employed in security, recruitment and manning roles to manage vetting risks and issues efficiently and effectively.

b. Security vetting does not, on its own, provide a guarantee of an individual's integrity and trustworthiness. Since both individuals and their circumstances change, a security clearance is only as good as the background records and investigations on which it is based at the time the review process is carried out. It is therefore essential that personnel security continues after initial clearance is approved and that any new information or concerns that may affect the reliability of a person are brought promptly to the attention of the Command Chain and Navy Command (NC) Security authorities. This is achieved through a combination of aftercare and security review procedures.

c. Our vetting regime is to be guided by four key principles of transparency, proportionality, confidentiality and timeliness. Personnel subject to vetting action that could affect their employability will be fully engaged with the vetting process and have the right to appeal against any decisions. The vetting process is never to be used as an alternative means of dismissing personal from the Service where other administrative or disciplinary action is more appropriate.

6302. Content

Navy Command security vetting policy outlined in the following Sections provide practical direction to personnel. Section 2 articulates the requirement for security vetting within the Royal Navy and explains the key vetting principles. Section 3 details responsibility for the granting or Denial of security clearances and residency waivers. Section 4 covers additional personnel security checks or screenings required for certain appointments. Section 4 covers additional personnel security checks or screenings required for certain appointments. Section 5 covers the need and mechanisms used for monitoring (Aftercare) of individuals post award of a security clearance, outlining the adverse vetting assessment procedures that at worst could ultimately result in Withdrawal. Section 6 details responsibilities and procedures relating to appeals against vetting decisions, e.g. Denial and/or Withdrawal of security clearance. Finally, Section 7 specifies the roles and responsibilities of individuals and the Chain of Command in ensuring that vetting procedures are carried out expeditiously and in a way that allows them to enable rather than constrain the delivery of maritime power.

6303. Scope

The security vetting principles and procedures detailed in this policy instruction apply to regular and reserve personnel serving in the ‘whole force’ Royal Navy, including Reserve Forces and Royal Fleet Auxiliary or as adult staff members of the Sea or Royal Marine Cadet Organisations.

SECTION 2

SECURITY VETTING PROCEDURES WITHIN THE ROYAL NAVY: REQUIREMENTS, RESPONSBILITIES AND PRINCIPLES

6304. Security Vetting - The Royal Navy Requirement

a. In recognition of the operational needs of the Royal Navy, the technical sophistication of its platforms and equipment and the unpredictability of future maritime tasks, all Royal Navy personnel are security vetted to a minimum of Security Check (SC) level initially granted for a maximum 10 year duration. However, personnel filling certain appointments where there is a need for frequent unsupervised access to Top Secret (TS) information may require a higher level of clearance, specifically Developed Vetting (DV) which, on award will be valid for 7 years. A further Enhanced DV (EDV) level of assurance , granted for 5 years was introduced in 2014 for some specific and highly sensitive posts, for example related to Defence Intelligence and Nuclear business. SC, DV and EDV comprise a system of security clearances that contribute to the maintenance of effective personnel security in the Royal Navy. The administration and implementation of this system must be governed and enacted in a manner which is robust, transparent, equitable and confidential, and coherent with the processes employed by United Kingdom Security Vetting (UKSV).

b. Counter Terrorist Checks (CTC) security clearances for the University Royal Navy Units (URNU) are sponsored by the relevant units and processed and issued by UKSV in accordance with Cabinet Office (CO)/MOD Personnel Security policy supplemented (where appropriate) by Navy specific policy or procedural requirements detailed in this Chapter. Procedures for the granting of security clearances and waivers, e.g. relating to UK residency, are detailed at Section 3.

c. Individuals have a responsibility for maintaining the appropriate level of security clearance and failure to fulfil this obligation may have an adverse effect on a service person's role, responsibility, employment and ultimately military operations.

d. From 8 Apr 24, ALL security clearances for service personnel currently employed will be applied for by Career Managers (CMs) via SCIO, which will draw on information contained within JPA. CMs are to ensure that they have access to, and understand the process for, creating SYVETT security clearance applications via the Career Manager App on SCIO. Replacing the SYVETT word document applications, the App will allow CMs to create an e-form clearance application. This process change will greatly increase the efficiency in the processing of applications as the need for emailed application forms will be removed.

e. To support this process all RN serving personnel are reminded to check JPA at least annually that their security clearance is in-date, as well as their personal details, including their place of birth. If no SC and/or DV security clearance is shown (noting that those holding a DV clearance do not require a separate SC) in the Competency Record the security clearance has either expired or not been updated by NSVS. If personnel are concerned about their security clearance status, or they find that their clearance has expired, they are to contact their CM who will ensure

that the JPA record is corrected or facilitate a re-application process for the security clearance.

6305. Developed Vetting

While the entry-level vetting requirement of SC for the Royal Navy can be justified on the basis of operating environment, what is less certain is the justification of the requirement for DV which is considerably more costly and involves a greater degree of discretion in its application. Line Management is responsible for determining and thereafter periodically reviewing the justification for post holders require DV, the addition of which will be approved by Navy PSyA Vetting Decisions. However, in the face of ever increasing financial pressure on the MOD vetting budget there remains an ongoing requirement for the Chain of Command /Line Managers to rigorously revalidate the justification for posts to require DV at least annually. Where a JPA PID has been confirmed/designated as requiring DV Competency it is incumbent on the CM/CoC/LM to ensure that appointees hold extant DV clearance on arrival in post, or failing this, that a DV review is in-hand with SYVETT/UKSV. Similarly it is the responsibility of the postholder and LM to ensure extant DV clearance is maintained throughout the duration of the appointment. Until such time that valid DV clearance is held the Subject and LM will receive periodic auto-generated e-mails from JPA outlining the action to be taken to redress. If for any reason the postholder is to remain in DV post without valid DV clearance a Risk Balance Case (RBC) must be raised and submitted outlining how the security risk will be mitigated. Failure to do so may result in the DV Competency requirement being arbitrarily removed from the JPA PID.

6306. Aftercare

a. Security vetting on its own does not provide a guarantee of an individual's enduring trustworthiness, integrity and reliability as individual circumstances and behaviours may change over time. It is fundamentally important that personnel security measures continue after a security clearance is granted to allow new information to be collated, analysed and acted upon by the security vetting authorities. The responsibility for raising and sharing this information lies with both the Subject and their line management and is achieved primarily through the Change in Personal Circumstances Questionnaire (CPC), Security Appraisal Form (SAF) and Aftercare Incident Report (AIR) processes. Where a CPC, SAF or AIR bring into doubt the suitability of an individual to hold (or to continue to hold) a security clearance, management procedures may be initiated.

b. Where such concerns have been raised, the Subject will be advised accordingly by UKSV and/or PSyA Personnel Security (Pers Sy) staff and afforded appropriate opportunity to respond/address the issue(s). Depending upon the seriousness of the concern (s), PSyA Pers Sy advice could take the form of an advisory telephone call or email through to a face-to-face interview coupled with directed written advice, usually in the form of a Formal Security Warning (FSW). It may also be necessary to initiate appropriate vetting aftercare arrangements. If this level of intervention and monitoring fails to resolve security concerns, it may become necessary for PSyA Pers Sy staff to consider (where appropriate, in consultation with UKSV) suspension or withdrawal of an individual's existing security clearance. Further information regarding adverse assessment procedures, and aftercare are provided in Section 4.

6307. Security Vetting - Personal Responsibility

Individuals have a responsibility for maintaining the appropriate level of security clearance and failure to fulfil this obligation may have an adverse effect on a subject's role, responsibilities, employment and ultimately military operations. Prior to expiry of SC/DV security clearance subjects will receive an auto-generated e-mail reminder from JPA to apply for a review of their security clearance. Reminders (copied to LM) will continue to be received monthly until security clearance has been reconfirmed by UKSV and extant details updated in JPA. The vetting system is not configured to handle frequent and numerous requests for timeline extensions or waivers. To support this process all Royal Navy personnel must ensure that they supply information requested by vetting authorities as honestly and expeditiously as possible, whether their role in the system is as a subject, a line manager/commander or as a referee. It should be noted that failure to comply with a request for further information will be taken as confirmation of a security concern and therefore could result in denial or immediate suspension or withdrawal of an individual's existing clearance. Additionally, line management and Security Risk Managers must be mindful of the security risk posed by vetting apathy and be prepared to support vetting endeavours, initiatives and where necessary formal security action. More detailed responsibilities can be found at Section 7.

6308. Principle 1 - Transparency

a. The effectiveness of security vetting procedures and security clearances depends upon open and honest communication between all individuals and/or organisations involved in the vetting process (subject to the need to maintain vetting confidentiality).

b. All of the processes[1] associated with security vetting are open, auditable and transparent and will be enacted in accordance with principles and procedures laid down in this Directive and JSP 440. PSyA Pers Sy/SYVETT staff and Establishment/Unit Security Officers (E/USOs) can provide further information regarding security clearance and vetting procedures on request.

c. As explained further in Section 5, those who are to be subjected to scheduled Aftercare following review of their security clearance and/or adverse assessment procedures which could potentially lead to Denial or Withdrawal of security clearance, will be informed in writing. Advice on how the security vetting system works and the potential ramifications of such action can be sought from PSyA Pers Sy staff. The only exception will be cases in which it is deemed appropriate to withhold notification to the Subject for national security reasons; this decision rests with Navy PSyA and will be auditable.

d. In Service personnel/Vetting Subjects may appeal against a decision to deny or withdraw security clearance. The security vetting system within the Royal Navy allows for internal appeal through the Navy Vetting Appeal Panel (NVAP) and thereafter, if the NVAP decision has been upheld and the appellant's appeal rejected, through the external route, the Security Vetting Appeals Panel (SVAP). Personnel not yet employed have no right of appeal through the NVAP or SVAP.

[1] This does not include information specific to individuals which remains vetting-in-confidence at all times.

6309. Principle 2 – Proportionality

Security vetting procedures provide assurances regarding the trustworthiness, integrity and reliability of serving (or potential) Royal Navy personnel and also assist security risk management reporting. However, any adverse assessment procedures or aftercare programmes will be applied proportionately to ensure they are legitimate and strictly to a level required to protect sensitive information and critical assets.

6310. Principle 3 - Confidentiality

a. The principle of vetting confidentiality will be applied in respect of all vetting casework. This principle dictates that vetting information is to be handled in a way that does not normally involve its disclosure outside the security community and that it is treated on a strict need-to-know basis. Occasions will, however, arise where effective security risk management necessitates the release of vetting information outside the appropriate security staffs. Such circumstances will be dealt with by PSyA Pers Sy staff on a case-by-case basis and the need-to-know principle will be strictly enforced in respect of any information that is released, thus maintaining an appropriate balance between confidentiality and security risk management/ operational imperatives. Information to which vetting confidentiality applies will only be reported by PSyA Pers Sy staff to the Chain of Command where there is a clear concern that a serious criminal offence (such as espionage) has been committed, or there has been a compromise to Defence capabilities or operations. In all such cases, the final decision to divulge information lies with Navy PSyA, who must balance the conflicting interests of confidentiality against disclosure on a case-by-case basis. Again, such a decision must be wholly justifiable and auditable, demonstrating that the correct balance has been achieved and that the credibility of the vetting system has not been undermined.

b. Appropriate measures are always to be taken to protect the confidentiality of security vetting information in transit. All vetting files and correspondence are to receive appropriate protective markings and descriptors (minimum of ’OFFICIAL SENSITIVE PERSONAL’, with Handling Instruction ’Vetting-In-Confidence’) and are to be transported or transmitted commensurately. Copies are not to be retained of material e.g. security questionnaires that have been submitted to the UKSV by anyone other than the individual. Personnel seeking information relating to themselves can do so through Subject Access Request (SAR) directly through UKSV.

6311. Principle 4 – Timeliness

Timely interaction and engagement are particularly critical where there is a risk that delays will impinge upon operational capability. Responsibility lies with Vetting Subjects, Line Management, Career Managers and Sponsors of applications for national security vetting clearances(to ensure that unnecessary delays do not occur. Timeliness is also paramount during the appeals process to ensure that vetting decisions are prompt and cases do not become protracted causing undue pressure on both the Subject and the Service.

SECTION 3

SECURITY CLEARANCES AND WAIVERS

6312. Authority

UKSV Personnel are authorised to grant security clearances for Service personnel assessed as Low Risk without recourse to Navy PSyA-Pers Sy. Otherwise the Navy PSyA-Pers Sy Vetting Team will decide and advise on the award or denial of a security clearance for all New Entrants and In-Service RN/RM personnel.

6313. Clearances

SC and DV clearances for all Royal Navy personnel, regardless of rank, are awarded by UKSV on the Service's behalf after first completion of the UK Government Baseline Personnel Security Standard (BPSS)[2]. However, for contentious cases, for example where there might be Nationality or Residency related issues or initial vetting checks reveal that the vetting candidate could potentially present one or more security concerns, e.g. has a criminal record or excessive financial liability, UKSV will refer the case to PSyA Pers Sy staff for a decision on whether or not a clearance should be granted, and if so whether any caveats or restrictions are to be put in place.

6314. Eligibility and Restrictions

JSP 440 Leaflet 2B provides specific criteria defining the eligibility of certain groups of individuals to hold a security clearance. Where operational circumstances require, waivers from the eligibility criteria may be granted as follows:

a. **Nationality Waivers.** Nationality in itself is not a bar to security clearance but for entry into the Naval Service a candidate must satisfy one of the nationality criteria[3] noting that applications from Dual Nationals of a Tier One Country, an extremely high risk of espionage activity occurring (formerly Countries to which Special Security Restrictions Apply (CSSRA) should not be entertained by RN Recruiters, e.g. R&A, as security clearance will NOT be granted. Similarly eligible Sole/Dual nationalities and personnel with close family living in Tier Two Countries, of which there is a high risk of espionage occurring, will be interviewed by UKSV in order to assess the security risk. Therefore, security clearance cannot be assumed.

b. In exceptional circumstances, a waiver of the recruitment eligibility criteria may be granted to candidates who are Commonwealth citizens or citizens of the Republic of Ireland (ROI) at the time of their application but were born outside the country of which they are now a citizen or have formerly held a different nationality. However, the residency requirements referred to below must also be met and where appropriate the former nationality may prohibit the granting of security clearance; cases are assessed on a case-by-case basis.

c. Some Branches/Specialisations are open to British citizens only as all personnel in these Branches/Specialisations are required to be cleared to DV and/or there is a significant likelihood that personnel will require access to STRAP material. Nevertheless, circumstances may arise where non-British nationals serving with the Royal Navy will require a security clearance from which they would normally be

[2] https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/government-baseline-personnel-security-standard
[3] Asylum Seekers are not eligible for entry into the Naval Service.

precluded (e.g. a non-British national recruited on the basis that they met the residency criteria for SC, but subsequently requiring a DV clearance)

d. **Residency Waivers.** The residency criteria and supporting documentation required for recruits to the Naval Service are detailed at Annex 63A. A residency waiver will also be sought by UKSV where the criteria is not met by serving personnel In accordance with the Policy outlined in JSP 440 Leaflet 2B – Security Clearance and Vetting, Annex C. Authority to waive residency requirements at both SC and DV levels rests with Navy PSyA Pers Sy and will be assessed on a case-by-case basis.

e. **Restrictions.**

(1) Personnel under the age of 17 will be issued with a Security Check (SC) with Restrictions.

(2) Personnel under the age of 21. Navy PSYA Per Sy retains the authority to determine the validity period of personnel under the age of 21. A clearance may be awarded with a shorter validity period; however, cases will be assessed on a case-by-case basis.

(3) **Police Investigations/Prosecutions.** If it becomes apparent that an applicant for clearance is being investigated by the Police or has been charged with an offence that has yet to be considered in court, **for initial cases**, the vetting application should be withdrawn by the 'Sponsor' or cancelled by UKSV and submitted once the matter has been resolved. **For Review Cases** the clearance should be '**Suspended' or 'extended'** (depending on the nature of the investigation) until the matter has been resolved.

f. **Initial Clearance on Entry into Service.** Recruitment and Attraction will try to recruit with sufficient time for the security clearance process to be completed. Where this is not the case it may be possible to raise a Risk Balance Case (RBC), which will need to be signed off at 2* level. The RBC will set out how the recruit will be managed in Phase One training before their clearance is received. The individual will have submitted a completed security questionnaire to UKSV and progress with the application for security clearance.

g. **Nationality.** Entry to the RN Service and thus eligibility for security clearance is the responsibility of Recruitment and Attraction.[4]

[4] Nationality in vetting is further outlined in JSP 440 Leaflet 2B – Security Clearances and Vetting.

6315. Reactivating, Transferring and Sharing Clearances

a. Some individuals joining/re-joining the Royal Navy, either as regular staff or as reservists, may have previously held a valid security clearance. All requests to reactivate a security clearance or to transfer it from another employer are to be submitted to UKSV by the 'new' employer within 12 months from the Service person's last day in the Service otherwise a new application for review of security clearance will be required. Note: Ex Regulars transferring to or re-entering the Reserves will NOT have any extant security clearance automatically transferred to their new employment.

b. It is also possible for a security clearance to be shared, e.g. a security cleared MOD civilian or defence contractor may also be a member of the reserve forces, in which case their existing security clearance can be shared and utilised for both requirements.

c. All requests to reactivate a security clearance, transfer it from or share it with another employer are to be submitted on-line to UKSV via the NSVS portal by a registered NSVS Sponsor.

6316. Temporary Clearance Action

a. **SC Extensions.** Where SC has recently expired, providing a re-application for security clearance has been initiated with "NAVY PSYA –SYVETT GROUP MAILBOX (MULTIUSER)" it may be possible for a temporary extension of the existing or expired clearance to be arranged while the new application is being processed by UKSV. Each case will be assessed on merit. In instances where security clearance has not been held for a prolonged period, i.e. expiry date prohibits an extension, providing a re-application for security clearance is underway the vetting subject is to maintain through a Risk Balance Case (RBC) until such time as the Review has been concluded.

b. **DV Extensions.** Navy PSyA-Pers Sy/UKSV will only consider a temporary extension of DV clearance if all of the following criteria are satisfied:

(1) Previous DV has only recently expired.

(2) An on-line application for a DV review has been completed by the individual and submitted to UKSV.

c. NAVY PSyA-Pers Sy is the sole authority for the granting of **Emergency Unsupervised Access (EUA)** (access to TOP SECRET) to Navy Command personnel, and may grant to meet extreme operational requirements, predominantly in overseas theatres of operations, where:

(1) An on-line application for DV has been completed and accepted by UKSV (NSVS).

(2) Initial NSVS automated checks have been concluded.

(3) The receiving unit whose post requires the incumbent to hold DV clearance has completed a Risk Balanced Case (RBC)[5] and implemented appropriate mitigation to reduce security risk to an acceptable level.

(4) The unit RBC has been reviewed and assured by Navy PSyA.

d. STRAP access will be refused under an EUA.

[5] See NC Security Regulations Version 4 – 01 Oct 2023.

SECTION 4

ADDITIONAL CHECKS UNDERTAKEN PRIOR TO APPOINTMENTS

6317. Loan/Local Foreign Service (LFS) Appointments

a. **Summary.** All Service personnel must be volunteers for Loan/Local Foreign Service (LFS). In addition reference should be made to Para 5911, Annex 59B, Annex 59B Appendix 1 and Annex 59C.

b. **Process.**

(1) Notwithstanding the fact that each single Service manages the selection of prospective LFS personnel differently, policy dictates that where there are local or cultural sensibilities some LFS posts require married accompanied service whilst others may be designated for unaccompanied service only. In addition some volunteers may not be deemed suitable due to the necessary consideration of factors such as the nationality of the volunteer or a close family member.

(2) Navy PSYA will determine if the LFS Assignment is not tenable at an early stage, however, this may not necessarily occur until award of security clearance review, e.g. information might not come to light until the end of a Security Vetting process. A Security Clearance may be awarded for the Volunteer but this does not necessarily mean that the Volunteer is suitable for the LFS Assignment.

c. **Assigning Principles.**

(1) The Assigning Principles for Loan Foreign Service for the RN/RM are contained in Chapter 59. It is essential that before a nomination is made and an Assignment Order approved NAVY PSYA (VETTING POSTINGS)is consulted at the earliest opportunity through NAVYPSYA-PERSONNELSECURITYGRP@mod.gov.uk to enable suitability from a security perspective to be ascertained. Details required are as follows:

Volunteer Name.
Service Number.
Proposed Assignment Location and JPAN.
Proposed Dates.
DV/SC security clearance requirement.

(2) Early engagement with Navy PSYA will assist in highlighting significant factors which would greatly decrease a volunteer's expectations for an Approved Assignment. Appendix 1 to Annex 59B outlines the reasons for non-recommendation for LFS. This list is not exhaustive. If a Volunteer is deemed unsuitable, the relevant Career Management organisation will be informed by Navy PSYA but not of the reasons why, however, if the Volunteer wishes to know the reason for non-recommendation, they are to request this through NAVY PSYA-VETTING POSTINGS. There is no appeals procedure for non-recommendation of LFS.

(3) If Navy PSYA is content for the LFS assignment to proceed, the security clearances required for the appointment will also be assessed and advised (for the whole of the assignment). It should be noted, however, that UKSV Vetting Officers do not travel and if a telephone interview is not an option it can be costly for personnel to return to UK for Vetting Interviews, potentially causing an un-necessary burden to the new unit.

6318. International Loan/Exchange Personnel - Security Clearance

a. JSP 440 (Part 2, Leaflet 7, Paragraph 173) highlights the key considerations to be taken into account before the establishment of an Exchange, Loan or Embedded post at Defence Establishments, including HM Ships. In particular, appropriate consultation must be undertaken to determine the suitability of permitting foreign nationals in such positions, not only from the aspect of access to UK classified information but also the requirement to prevent access to particularly sensitive areas and to classified information provided to the UK MoD by international partners (i.e. Five Eyes) which must not be accessed by Exchange, Loan or Embedded personnel unless prior written approval of the partner/country owning the information is held.

b. The appointment of an Exchange, Loan or Embedded person should normally be formalised following the negotiation of a Memorandum of Understanding or similar Arrangement which, amongst other aspects, should detail the security clearance requirements for the appointment. Prior to assignment of the Exchange, Loan or Embedded personnel, the relevant Career Manager is to ensure that a Security Clearance certificate for the individual concerned is provided by the individual's parent government department to the MoD host.

6319. Security - Partners Across Government (PAG) Screening

a. PAG reserve the right to undertake additional Personnel Screening for JPA positions that will necessitate access to their `assets' (systems). Such positions will/should be identifiable by the PAG Competency requirement attached to the JPA Position Competency: Security|PAG Screening JPAN|Joint|. It is the unit/Establishment's responsibility to ensure that the JPA Competence is 'pinned' to the position as a 'marker', annotating that additional security screening is required by PAG. PAG retain the right to refuse to screen if the relevant competence is not pinned to the JPA position. It should also be noted that PAG screening is to be undertaken for all relevant assignments. It must not be assumed an individual cleared for one appointment requiring access will automatically qualify for another without further screening.

b. **Process.** Where Careers Managers/Line Managers/Importing Units see the Competency Security|PAG Screening JPAN|Joint annotated on JPA and there is a requirement for PAG Screening the following actions are to be taken:

(1) Notify NAVY PSYA-VETTING POSTINGS on assigning through NAVYPSYA-PERSONNELSECURITYGRP@mod.gov.uk to signpost that PAG Screening will be required for a proposed assignment. PAG screening is a complex business and sometimes needs further consultation, therefore a minimum of 5 months -notice needs to be given before assignment dates in order to facilitate the request noting that a valid DV is pre-condition.

Details required as follows:

Name.
Service Number.
JPA Position that requires PAG screening.
Proposed Assignment dates.
DV Security dates.

(2) Nominee to raise a Security Appraisal Form (SAF) (if one has not been produced within the last 12 months) and send to NAVY PSYA-VETTING POSTINGS through NAVYPSYA-PERSONNELSECURITYGRP@mod.gov.uk.

(3) Extant DV Security Clearance MUST not exceed a 7 year Clearance for screening to occur. Personnel with a DV Clearance over 7 years will automatically be rejected by NAVY PSYA-VETTING POSTINGS resulting in a delayed assignment (PAG screening will not be entertained until a DV review has been undertaken and clearance awarded).

(4) Delays to assignments may occur if this process is not met in full.

c. **Screening Success.** On success of the PAG Screening NAVY PSYA-VETTING POSTINGS will notify Career Managers/Line Managers to enable an Approved Assignment Order to be raised. Career Managers are advised not to second guess the outcome as the fact an individual holds a valid DV does not indicate or dictate PAG will accept any potential risk.

d. If PAG deny access to their assets; the Service Person (SP) will be informed through their Chain of Command of the denial. The reason for the denial will not be informed. There is ‘no Appeal’ route for PAG denial..

6320. SAP/SPECAP

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6321. STRAP and Nationality

a. Where nationality in vetting[6] is identified, a security Pressure brief may on occasion be issued by Navy PSYA Per Sy to RN personnel via their Unit Security Officer (USO) or Chain of Command signposting the nationalities in vetting and the security briefing actions required.

b. Additionally where nationality in vetting is identified and RN personnel are holders of a DV security clearance/EDV assurance and require access to STRAP; there may also be a requirement to issue an individual with a STRAP and Nationality letter outlining compliance with STRAP and assurance requirements.[7]

c. An Assignment Restriction will be added to JPA in such cases signposting the relevant Career Manager to the Process.

(1) The Career Manager is to initiate 'Application for Access to STRAP' ('Form 1'); completing the Sponsor Section.

(2) Forward 'Form 1' to the Service person being assigned to the STRAP assignment.

(3) On completion, the 'Form 1' is to be forwarded to the Corporate STRAPSO.

(4) If the STRAP Authorities approve the assignment, an Assignment Order can be released (not before).

[6] JSP 440 Leaflet 2B – Security Clearances and Vetting.
[7] JSP 440 Part 2 V7.0 Leaflet 4G – Special Information Control Systems (Inc STRAP)

SECTION 5

VETTING MANAGEMENT AND DECISION MAKING

6322. Continuous Vetting Management

Security vetting on its own does not provide a guarantee of an individual's enduring trustworthiness, integrity and reliability as individual circumstances and behaviours may change over time. It is therefore fundamental that Commands and personnel ensure that personnel security measures continue after a security clearance has been granted. This enables clearances to be updated depending on circumstances, allows new information to be collated, analysed and then, if necessary, acted upon by the security vetting authorities. The main processes for maintaining personnel security oversight include:

a. Change of Personal Circumstances (CPC) forms.

b. Security Appraisal Forms (SAF).

c. Aftercare Incident Reports (AIR).

d. Financial Questionnaires.

6323. Vetting Decision Making

a. Capt PSYA is the authority for RN vetting decisions. This is delegated to the PSYA Vetting Team. The types of vetting decisions and the persons authorised to make these decisions are included in the tables below. The RN PSYA's vetting decision makers work collaboratively. Vetting cases are referred to RN PSYA by United Kingdom Vetting Services (UKSV). All National Security Vetting decisions are assessed using the personnel security guidelines contained in the Cabinet Office Policy Framework.

b. Vetting decisions include:

Denial	Refusal to grant a clearance, either on recruitment or in-service.
Suspension	A temporary measure, where the clearance is placed in abeyance to enable an investigation and/or administrative action to be concluded/completed.
Withdrawal	Removal of a clearance previously granted. The decision maker should consider both vetting information and the requirements of the assignment. General knowledge of the requirements of most assignments within the RN is vested within NC PSyA (Capt and COS) so wider consultation with DACOS CM or other personnel is not a pre-requisite but may be necessary or appropriate.
Lapsing	When an employee no longer requires a clearance to conduct their duties. If required, lapsed clearances may be re-instated within one year of being lapsed subject to the clearance being extant (i.e. within date and not time expired)
Loan Foreign Service/Local Foreign Service	Under the Assigning Principles for LFS before a nomination is made and an Assignment Order is approved, Navy PSyA is consulted at the earliest opportunity by CMs to enable suitability from a personnel security perspective to be ascertained.

c. Vetting Decision Matrix.

SER	DECISION	PERSON	AUTHORITY	FIRST APPEAL
1	Cancellation of SC/DV Application[8]	On recruitment – all	Band D Vetting Team	NA
2	Denial of SC, Recruitment /Re-Entry/FTRS	OR2 – OF3	SO2 Vetting TL	NA
3	Denial of SC, Recruitment /Re-Entry/FTRS	OF4-5	SO1 Decisions	NA
4	Denial of SC, Recruitment /Re-Entry/FTRS	OF6 and above	Capt PSYA	NA
5	Suspension of SC	OR2 – OF3	SO2 Vetting TL	NA
6	Suspension of SC	OF 4-5	SO1 Decisions	NA
7	Suspension of SC	OF 6 and above	Capt PSYA	NA
8	Withdrawal of SC	OR2 – OF3	SO2 Vetting TL	NVAP[9]
9	Withdrawal of SC	OF4-5	SO1 Decisions	NVAP
10	Withdrawal of SC	OF 6	Capt PSYA	NVAP
11	Withdrawal of SC	OF7 and above	COS HQ	Nav Sec
12	Denial of DV, Recruitment/Re-entry/FTRS	OR2 – OF3	SO2 Vetting TL	NA
13	Denial of DV, Recruitment/Re-entry/FTRS	OF4-5	SO1 Decisions	NA
14	Denial of DV, Recruitment/Re-entry/FTRS	OF6 and above	Capt PSYA	NA
15	Denial of DV in-service application	OR2 – OF3	SO2 Vetting TL	NVAP
16	Denial of DV in-service application	OF4-5	SO1 Decisions	NVAP
17	Denial of DV, in-service application	OF6	Capt PSYA	NVAP
18	Denial of DV, in-service application	OF 7 and above	COS HQ	Nav Sec
19	Suspension of DV	OR2 – OF3	SO2 Vetting TL	NA
20	Suspension of DV	OF4-5	SO1 Decisions	NA
21	Suspension of DV	OF6 and above	Capt PSYA	NA
22	Lapsing of DV no longer required	All	Band D Vetting Team in conjunction with CM	NA
23	Withdrawal of DV	OR2 – OF3	SO2 Vetting TL	NVAP
24	Withdrawal of DV	OF4-5	SO1 Decisions	
25	Withdrawal of DV	OF6	Capt PSYA	NVAP
26	Withdrawal of DV	OF7 and above	COS HQ	Nav Sec
27	Re-instatement of Suspended security clearance, Issue of Formal Security Warning	SC – As Ser 5-7 DV – As Ser 18-20		

[8] Reasons for cancellation of SC/DV Applications are not exhaustive.
[9] Navy Vetting Appeal Panel. Constitution: COS HQ and Hd CM

28	Denial of Local/Loan Foreign Service (LFS)	OR2-OF3	SO2 Vetting TL	NA
29	Denial of Local/Loan Foreign Service (LFS)	OF4-5	SO1 Decisions	NA
30	Denial of Local/Loan Foreign Service (LFS)	OF6 and above	Capt PSYA	NA
31	Initiation of EOF Process with UKSV[10]	ALL	Band D Vetting Team	NA
32	Assignment Restriction	For security and nationality reasons	Band D Vetting Team	NA
33	Withdrawal of all Clearances	On Discharge - Services No Longer Required (SNLR); re-entry to the RN is not permitted	Band D Vetting Team	NA
34	Issue Formal Security (Drugs Misuse) Warning	ALL	SO1 Decisions	NA

d. Outcomes of Continuous Vetting Management Where there are concerns that an individual's[11] behaviour or lifestyle may impact on their suitability to retain a security clearance, UKSV will notify Navy PSyA through PSyA Pers Sy staff. Following further investigation, if UKSV's concerns are justified then PSyA Pers Sy staff will initiate appropriate action which in the majority of cases will result in individuals being notified of the concerns raised. Normally the Subject will already be aware, for example having previously been advised in writing by UKSV of the need for further reviews. However, if the concerns were new, the Subject would be informed either by telephone call, letter or face-to-face interview depending upon the seriousness of the matters at issue; this ensures the Subject understands why their behaviour is causing concern and the potential ramifications. Where appropriate, the Subject may be informed that they will be subject to a further aftercare review after a set period of time[12] in order to ensure that appropriate progress is being made. If the reviews indicate that the Subject is not heeding advice then review frequency may be increased or the matter escalated further by PSyA Pers Sy staff. Throughout this advisory process the principles of transparency, proportionality and vetting confidentiality will be rigorously applied. Completed SAFs, CPCs and AIRs which raise security concerns will be referred by UKSV to PSYA vetting for a decision. To enable a diligent decision, PSYA might task UKSV to interview personnel. UKSV then complete the interview, assess the case and make recommendations to PSYA, as the decision-making authority for RN personnel. The decision options are as per the Vetting Decision Matrix.

e. **Formal Security Warning (FSW).** A useful risk management tool is the use of a Formal Security Warning (FSW). The issue of a FSW affords an individual the opportunity to retain the relevant security clearance and a final chance to resolve the vetting concerns; rather than having a security clearance withdrawn.

[10] Initiation of Establishment of the Facts (EOF) – A process owned by United Kingdom Security Vetting (UKSV) to consider denial of a security clearance.
[11] To whom this Directive applies.
[12] Time period to be set by NC PSyA Pers Sy staff and usually ranges between 12 and 24 months.

(1) The FSW process is administered by the vetting team. A FSW can be delivered face to face by Capt PSYA, the preferred option, or occasionally delegated to COs. Improvement in behaviours is expected and the subject is likely to be interviewed thereafter by UKSV to confirm this. Should behaviours not have improved, then the option of security clearance withdrawal remains. The FSW will make this expectation very clear.

(2) Following the delivery of an FSW, in providing a Subject with any written correspondence detailing why their behaviour is causing concern and the potential ramifications, PSyA staff are to ensure that:

(a) The letter is to be signed and dated by the individual administering the advisory/FSW interview.

(b) The Subject is to also sign and date the letter to acknowledge receipt and that they understand its contents. The signature is normally to be obtained during the interview.

(c) In circumstances where the subject is overseas and can only be notified of security advice or issued with a FSW in writing, the subject is to return a signed and dated copy of the letter as soon as possible to acknowledge both receipt and that its contents have been understood.

f. **Formal Security (Drug Misuse) Warning.** PSYA can consider issuing a Formal Security (Drugs Misuse) Warning when misuse of substances is admitted in vetting, and submitting the clearance applicant onto the Individual Re-Test (IRT) list for five years[13]. This supports increased security risk management, may allow for the retention of SC security clearance in continuation and might reduce the time for re-application for a DV security clearance if ‘denied’ or ‘withdrawn’.

(1) The Drugs Misuse Warning is administered by the Vetting Team, under the authority of SO1 Vetting Decisions. Warnings can be delivered in person, however for efficiency they are usually delivered via email. The clearance applicant’s line management/Chain of Command are not informed.

(2) SO1 Vetting Decisions provides a name and service number only directly to the CDT WO1.

(3) The Drugs Misuse Warning cannot be appealed.

[13] JSP 835 Pt1 (V5.1 Jun 22) Ch 4 Para 7.d

6324. Suspension and Lapsing of a Security Clearance

a. The PSYA vetting team will consider the suspension of an individual's security clearance as a tool to mitigate personnel security risks that have been identified or alleged. This supports both risk mitigation and the subject to better manage the relevant issues, without prejudice. It provides space for UKSV to engage with the subject and analyse the case, and space for PSYA to make a decision knowing that the risks to both the Navy and subject have been sufficiently mitigated. The suspension decision cannot be appealed. Suspension is considered when, for example,

(1) A recommendation to withdraw that Subject's security clearance is being prepared.

(2) The Subject is being investigated for a serious criminal or disciplinary offence.[14]

(3) The Subject is the subject of administrative action which may lead to discharge.

(4) The Subject is due to be court-martialled.

(5) Subject is alleged to be involved in drug abuse.

(6) An AIR is received where the CO recommends suspension of a security clearance.

(7) A DV holder faces allegations concerning behaviours which if admitted would cause the DV to be considered for withdrawal.

(8) The Subject denies UKSV the opportunity to assess their suitability to hold a security clearance e.g. by repeatedly failing to provide adequate information about their circumstances.

(9) Other serious circumstances exist which require further enquiries or investigation.

b. The PSYA vetting team can consider lapsing a DV when the subject no longer requires one. This is a useful vetting tool when circumstances are such that a more up to date UKSV vetting interview would provide evidence for a diligent vetting decision as the subject heads into a new DV posting following at least a year away from a DV post. The decision to lapse cannot be appealed, and is made "without prejudice".

c. Where a clearance has been 'suspended' or the Service Person/vetting subject does not hold a National Security Clearance, they are to be risk managed through a Risk Balance Case (RBC).

[14] Para 6314 e. Restrictions - Police Investigations/Prosecutions, may apply.

6325. Vetting Aftercare

a. In some cases where an individual's professional or personal conduct causes concern in relation to their suitability to obtain or retain a security clearance, PSyA Pers Sy staff may not deem it proportionate to initiate procedures to withdraw, deny or suspend their clearance immediately. Rather, they may choose to place the individuals on the UKSV SC or DV Risk Register, as appropriate, and then manage the security risk posed by the individual. This risk management process is known as "Ongoing Personnel Security Management[15] (otherwise known as Aftercare). It may be applied in respect of concerns which arise during the initial vetting process, during vetting reviews, or as a result of the submission of an Aftercare Incident Report (AIR).

b. Individuals for whom aftercare procedures are deemed appropriate will normally undergo additional reviews of their suitability to hold their current level of security clearance. For example, an individual who has been granted SC clearance valid for 10 years, but who has financial problems, may have their financial situation reviewed 18 months after their clearance has been granted. After each review, UKSV will make an assessment of the risk that the individual poses to the RN and inform PSyA staff for consideration.

c. Where aftercare does not meet the desired objectives, a vetting decision might be required to withdraw a clearance. However, the majority of individuals subject to aftercare action are removed from the risk management process in due course, having successfully addressed their issues. For some personnel, the Assignment Restriction (AR) process outlined below may also be an appropriate risk management mechanism, used to ensure that an individual is not assigned to a post that is incompatible with the risk that they may pose.

6326. Assignment Restrictions (AR)

An AR[16] is a referral mechanism to ensure that PSyA Pers Sy staff or Corporate STRAPSO are consulted before Career Managers (CM) assign individuals with security concerns or where security conflicts of interest could arise. An AR may be recommended by UKSV and/or implemented by PSyA Pers Sy staff by inserting a `flag' in the individual's 'Assignment Restriction' field on JPA. This flag is only visible to CMs and PSyA staff and does not disclose the nature of the restriction.

a. **AR based on Nationality.** . UKSV will inform Navy PSyA about new recruits or serving personnel holding dual or non-UK nationality where an AR is deemed necessary. UKSV may therefore refer cases to PSyA for AR purposes where:

(1) Spouse or partner is not solely a UK national.

(2) Siblings and/or surviving parents are not solely UK nationals.

(3) Subject has distant surviving relatives who are not solely UK nationals.

(4) Spouse/partners' surviving parents are not solely UK nationals.

[15] JSP 440 Leaflet 2B – Security Clearances and Vetting
[16] Previously known as a 'STOP Notice' or 'Top Enclosure Card'.

b. **AR based on Security Concerns.** Where UKSV staff consider that a potential security issue exists and may warrant AR action, PSyA staff will be contacted and retain authority for imposing an AR; with a notification to the relevant Career Manager. Examples where an AR would be raised include:

(1) Where police/unit investigative action is ongoing.

(2) Where Vetting Medical Concerns have arisen.

(3) Where significant financial issues are being reviewed by UKSV.

(4) Where there are suspected paramilitary, terrorist or subversive connections.

(5) Where family members reside permanently overseas.

(6) Where UKSV inquiries are pending to establish whether issues of security concern exist.

(7) Where Navy PSyA has cause for concern in a security context.

c. **AR Review.** Navy PSyA is to ensure that reviews of AR are carried out at appropriate intervals to ensure validity. When reviews of individual cases are due, PSyA-Pers Staff are to liaise with UKSV and ascertain whether the reasons for AR imposition remain valid. Where the AR can be removed, PSyA Pers Sy staff are to ensure that an individual's JPA record and NSVS vetting records are amended accordingly informing the service personnel and Career Manager; if applicable.

SECTION 6

PROCEDURES FOR APPEALS AGAINST VETTING DECISIONS

6327. Internal Appeal

a. Serving personnel whose SC or DV has been withdrawn, or whose initial DV application has been denied, have the right to appeal the decision. There is no right of appeal against a decision to deny initial SC or DV on recruitment, i.e. where the applicant is not yet in-Service/employed, where the case has been referred by UKSV to PSYA and subsequently PSYA recommend denial.

b. The internal appeal is considered by the Navy Vetting Appeal Panel (NVAP). The NVAP is chaired at 1* by Navy Command COS HQ, supported at OF5 by Head Career Manager. Staffing of NVAP appeals is supported by Navy Legal, ensuring a clear gap between PSYA vetting decisions, appellants and appeal decision makers.

c. The Vetting Subject will have received a detailed letter from PSYA confirming the denial or withdrawal of the relevant security clearance, the reasons why the decision has been made and the outline of the appeal route with any potentially relevant timings. The letter will also confirm the subject's rights to both internal (NVAP) and external (Security Vetting Appeal Panel - SVAP) appeals and a re-application for a further DV clearance being entertained.

d. Should the subject decide to appeal the PSYA Per Sy decision to the NVAP, the NVAP appeal submission timelines will be specified in the letter detailing the vetting decision. The timelines are as follows; any exceptional reasons for an extension to these timelines are to be raised by the appellant to the Vetting Team Leader for consideration.

(1) **Seven Days.** Notice of intention to submit an appeal. From receipt of the vetting decision to providing notice to the Vetting Team Leader of intention to appeal.

(2) **Seven Days.** Appellant's submission of case to the NVAP. From receipt by the Vetting Team Leader of the notice of intention to appeal, to receipt by the Vetting Team Leader of the appellants case to the NVAP.

(3) **Three Months.** From receipt by the Vetting Team Leader of the appellant's case to the NVAP, to receipt by the appellant of a letter from the NVAP detailing their decision. Operational imperatives and priorities may impact this timeline, but every effort will be made to respond as promptly as possible.

e. Whilst the appeal is with the NVAP, the service person (appellant) should remain in the current JPA position, where it is feasible to do so. Further guidance will be given on conclusion of the NVAP outcome.

6328. External Appeals - Procedures for Review by the Security Vetting Appeals Panel (SVAP)

a. When the internal appeal process has been exhausted, the Subject may appeal to the Cabinet Office's SVAP. The SVAP is an independent body sponsored by the Intelligence and Security Secretariat (Security Policy Division) of the Cabinet Office. The SVAP exists to provide an independent avenue of appeal for personnel whose security clearance has been denied or withdrawn and to make recommendations to the appropriate TLB.

b. SVAP appeal submission timelines will be included within the letter to appellants from the NVAP, should the appellant's internal appeal be rejected and if the appellant wishes to submit an appeal externally. Any extension of this timing remains a matter between the SVAP and the appellant.

c. The SVAP currently require an appeal to be submitted within 28 days of the date of the NVAP's letter which confirms the NVSAP decision.

d. Once an appeal is submitted to the SVAP, the SVAP will confirm with the appellant and Navy Command that the appeal falls within their remit and detail the requirements from each party including timings.

e. Following receipt of an initial letter of appeal, the SVAP Secretariat will provide additional guidance to the appellant on how they should proceed with their appeal. In brief, the SVAP Secretariat will decide whether the case falls within the remit of the Panel and will then advise the Subject accordingly. The appellant will be asked to provide a written statement of their case within a deadline set by the SVAP Secretariat. PSYA Per Sy will be invited to respond to the appellant's submission and the latter will be allowed to see the PSYA's case and comments on the appellant's appeal. Once the SVAP has gathered all required evidence, the appellant and two Navy representatives, SO1 Vetting Decisions and COS HQ will be invited to attend an informal confidential hearing during which the SVAP will consider the case.

f. On completion, and normally within 6 weeks, the SVAP decision and advice will be sent to the RN and the appellant. The decision as to whether or not to accept a SVAP recommendation to grant or restore a security clearance rests solely with Director Naval Staff (DNS). DNS will inform the appellant and the SVAP of this decision in writing within 15 working days of receiving the SVAP recommendations. This decision cannot be appealed further.

6329. Discharge Policy

a. RN policy in relation to security clearance is that all Naval Service personnel are to be security vetted to a minimum of SC security clearance. The RN can no longer employ those who do not hold this minimum security clearance. Circumstances where a loss of DV can render an individual unemployable in their branch might also result in an application for discharge.

b. Once the internal NVAP process is concluded, if the appellant is unsuccessful appropriate discharge applications are to be completed. Individuals will not be retained in the Service whilst they exhaust the external security clearance appeal route via the SVAP.

6330. Welfare of the Vetting Subject - SCART

On initiation of the appeal process Navy PSyA is to engage the Chain of Command; who may in turn wish to inform the RN Sensitive Case Advice Reaction Team (SCART) that there is an ongoing personnel security issue involving the subject which may result in associated welfare issues.

SECTION 7

SECURITY VETTING PROCEDURES - INDIVIDUAL AND CHAIN OF COMMAND RESPONSIBILITIES

6331. Individual and Chain of Command Responsibilities

Naval Service personnel must be aware of the following responsibilities to ensure that security vetting procedures are an effective enabler to maritime operations:

a. All personnel are to:

(1) Monitor the status of their own security clearances on JPA[17] to ensure they remain extant, undertaking the requirement for National Security Clearance application when required to undertake.

(2) Respond positively and promptly to any request from UKSV or PSyA Pers Sy staff for supplementary information in support of security vetting, e.g. completion of Financial Questionnaires.

(3) Advise UKSV of any significant changes in personal circumstances (such as marriage, divorce, cohabitation with a partner, diagnosis of a long-term medical condition, bankruptcy or windfalls)[18].

b. It is an annual mandatory requirement for **all** DV holders to complete an annual Security Appraisal Form (SAF) on the anniversary of the date of the DV/EDV award. For further information, contact Unit Security Staff or PSyA Pers Sy staff. The preferred method for SAF completion is through the eSAF process. An auto email will be generated through JPA for service personnel on the anniversary of their clearance award notifying when the SAF is due to be completed.

c. Line managers/reporting officers are to complete the relevant section of the SAF process for DV/EDV holders.

d. All personnel (either as subjects or referees) are to make themselves available as quickly as possible for interview by UKSV vetting officers if requested.

e. Commanders at all levels are to release personnel from duty, as required, to attend interviews with UKSV Vetting Officers and/or PSyA Pers Sy staff.

f. Should information become available that raises doubts about an individual's suitability for access to classified information or assets, the circumstances are to liaise with their Unit Security Officer to instigate raising an Aftercare Incident Report (AIR) where applicable. Where Unit Security Staff are not available, line management are to instigate AIR action [19].

[17] At least annually, as part of the mandatory checks of personal data.
[18] Through GOV.UK – UKSV National Security Vetting portal
[19] Through GOV.UK – Guidance Aftercare and Existing Clearances

ANNEX 63A

RESIDENCY REQUIREMENTS FOR NAVAL SERVICE RECRUITS

1. For security clearance to be issued, all candidates should have resided continuously in the UK immediately before their application. The specific length of this residency requirement is determined by the security clearance required and is outlined below. Residency Requirements are outlined in JSP440, Part 2, Leaflet 2B., Annex C - Residency.

	CTC Clearance	SC Clearance	DV Clearance
UK Residency requirements immediately prior to the security clearance application	3 years	5 years	10 years

2. Failure to meet the minimum residency requirements undermines the ability of United Kingdom Security Vetting (UKSV) to conduct comprehensive security checks and would present an increased security risk to the Naval Service. It is, however, recognised to meet specific recruiting targets, it may in exceptional circumstances, be viable to accept an increased level of risk and accept a shorter UK residency period provided the risk is outweighed by a specific need and can be managed appropriately.

3. In line with the direction in JSP 440 Leaflet 2B, Security Clearances and Vetting, Service Lead Commands (SLCs) are authorised to risk manage their residency requirements. A shorter period of UK residency may be accepted provided that satisfactory additional supporting evidence of an applicant's loyalty, reliability and trustworthiness is produced, and appropriate risk management measures are implemented. This is known as a Residency Waiver (RW).

4. It is the responsibility of the Recruiter to verify that candidates meet minimum requirements relating to UK Residency after first undertaking the Baseline Personnel Security Standard (BPSS) [1] to ascertain the 4 checks for an individual:

a. Identity ID)

b. Right to Work (RTW) in the UK

c. Employment History

d. Criminal Record (unspent convictions)

5. Residency Waivers are considered on a case-by-case basis. Meeting the criteria does not guarantee that a Residency Waiver will be issued thus enabling a progression of a National Security Vetting clearance application.

[1] https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/government-baseline-personnel-security-standard

6. A Residency Waiver (RW) effectively underwrites security clearance until the minimum UK residency requirement will be met and UKSV can undertake a full security check. The supporting documentation/evidence specified in the Appendices to this Annex is therefore required to enable Navy PSyA to assess the security risk that would be borne if a residency waiver is granted.

7. The approved period of UK Residency for progressing a National Security Vetting Application is available on request from Navy PSYA Personnel Security NAVYPSYA-PERSONNELSECURITYGRP@mod.gov.uk or Recruitment and Attraction Overseas Team NAVYRA-OSEASADMINMAILBOX@mod.gov.uk

8. **Process.** Ensure that the Sy clearance vetting application and Residency Waiver paperwork are submitted in parallel via the relevant Residency Waiver management Team

Note. *Where a National Security Vetting Solution (NSVS) vetting application has been submitted and there is no Residency Waiver confirmation of documentation having been received; the NSVS Vetting application will be cancelled with UKSV at the 3 month point of the submission to UKSV.*

9. Residency Waivers should not be sent directly to Navy PSyA Per Sy; please ensure that these are sent through the relevant desk within R&A HQ - NAVYRA-OSEASADMINMAILBOX@mod.gov.uk

10. **Best Practice.** Is that the Security Check (SC) vetting application should be sponsored only after the vetting applicant has completed their security application form. The application will only be submitted to UKSV once both parts are complete (this is known as activation).

11. Ensure ALL documentation is provided by the vetting candidate[2]; references should only be accepted on headed paper.

12. Residency Waiver paperwork does not need to be submitted twice. If a vetting candidate has been awarded SC Sy clearance with approval of a Residency Waiver but has not entered service within a 12 -month window of award of the clearance, the awarded clearance will be 'lapsed' and a Review initiated. PSyA will only require an up-to-date Police Certificate to progress the SC Review.

[2] Appendix 2 to Annex 63A

APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX 63A

CANDIDATE VETTING FLOWCHART



APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX 63A

CRITERIA FOR CONSIDERING APPLICATIONS FOR RESIDENCY WAIVERS

1. To be considered for a security clearance Residency Waiver (RW), the candidate must supply the ESSENTIAL following official documentation and where appropriate on headed paper.

(a) A copy of their Birth Certificate.

(b) A copy of the photograph page of their passport. To also include any visa entry/exit stamps.

(c) A Police Certificate from the host nation police service, outlining what, if any, convictions the candidate has. If not produced in English, the candidate is to submit the original certificate accompanied by a translation, certified by a professional translator, along with the original document.

2. Depending on the Circumstances and why a RW is being issued; the following is to be included:

(a) A detailed itinerary of where the candidate has travelled/studied outside of the UK.

(b) Details of where they resided, including names, and addresses if any private residences used.

(c) Name, address and telephone numbers of any travelling/studying companions.

(d) For those candidates who also have worked overseas for e.g. during their ‘gap year’, full details of the employer, the period of employment and the nature of job.

(e) Written Character references (school/employment/other recognised professionals (please specify).

(f) Evidence of educational qualifications attained (where appropriate).

ANNEX 63B

FORMAL SECURITY (DRUG MISUSE) WARNING

1. You are formally warned for suspicion of involvement in substance misuse. From the date of this warning, you will be subject to compulsory retesting without warning at any time in accordance with JSP 835 Pt 1 (V5.1 Jun 22) Ch 4 Para 7.d.

a. You are reminded that drug misuse is illegal and incompatible with service in the Royal Navy. You are further warned that drug misuse is regarded as evidence of unreliability in the context of security clearances. Should you in the future provide a positive test because of CDT you will immediately be administratively discharged from the Service.

b. I should also warn you that you will be subject to re-testing by the CDT Team without prior notice at any time in the next 5 years from the date of this formal warning.

c. You cannot appeal this drug warning decision.

2. Acknowledgement of Drug Warning by Service Person

Signature: .....

Rank/Rate: ..... Name: .....

Appt: ..... Date: .....