

APPENDIX A

UNITED STATES AIR FORCES

The United States Air Forces were organized as follows :—

- (a) The United States Naval Aviation (or Naval Aeronautical Organization).
- (b) The United States Army Air Corps.

The Army Air Corps were employed under the command of the army for army purposes. Naval Aviation and the Army Air Corps, however, on occasion supported each other. In addition, the Army Air Corps, when called upon to do so, would normally execute strategic missions which might have no direct relation with the functions being carried out in support of the Army or the Navy. In this respect the role of the Army Air Corps might be said to be similar to that of the R.A.F. when carrying out independent air action.

The United States Naval Aviation was employed under naval command for naval purposes. It consisted of four categories of combat aircraft : first, those considered as integral parts of the combatant ships to which attached, viz., aircraft carriers, battleships and cruisers ; second, long-range patrol bomber aircraft attached to shore bases or mobile tenders ; third, shore-based observation aircraft for the patrol of coastal zones ; and fourth, bombers, scouts, and fighters for the use of the Marine Corps. Land-based aircraft of the United States Marine Corps functioned under naval command for the defence of advanced bases.

Both combat and non-combat activities were carried on by naval aviation. The first included carrier, Marine, and patrol aviation and two lesser types : battleship and cruiser aviation, consisting of small seaplanes used primarily to direct ships' gunfire and coastal-patrol aviation employing small land and seaplanes to protect port areas and coastal convoys against submarine attack. Non-combat functions were performed by utility squadrons and the Naval Air Transportation Service. In addition, the Coast Guard operated as part of the Navy during the war, and its air units were employed in anti-submarine warfare and air-sea rescue work.

Carrier Aviation

Carrier aviation may be considered in three parts : the fast-carrier striking forces, the escort-carrier forces, and Marine-carrier aviation.

The functions performed by the fast carriers included offence, defence, and reconnaissance against enemy aircraft, warships, merchant vessels, and beachhead targets. They were primarily an offensive weapon used to gain control of vast sea areas and to destroy enemy forces which threatened friendly fleet or amphibious operations. These functions required mobility, flexibility, aerial power, and defensive armament.

The fast carriers included both large, fast, 100-plane carriers and light, equally fast, 33-plane carriers. Fighter, dive-bomber and torpedo-bomber squadrons were organized in carrier air groups and trained to operate together as co-ordinated striking units. Specialized night-fighter aircraft and high speed photographic planes also flew from fast carriers.

Fast carriers were normally operated in task groups of carriers, battleships, cruisers and destroyers, under a single command. Two to five task groups composed a fast-carrier task force.

Escort carriers provided air and anti-submarine defence of invasion convoys and beachhead areas and close support of invasion troops until such time as these functions could be taken over by shore-based aircraft. The carriers themselves were smaller, slower ships of about 30-plane capacity, on which were based squadrons of fighters and torpedo bombers. In amphibious operations escort carriers were normally employed in formations of 4 to 7 carriers with 6 to 12 destroyers and destroyer escorts, but single carriers with fewer escorts were used for specialized anti-submarine or convoy escort operations.

Marine-carrier aviation was of two kinds. In the first place, the marines were expected to act as a reserve for naval aviation, though this function was not exercised in the early part of the war. Beginning in December 1944, a number of Marine fighter squadrons were used on the fast carriers. During the same year, the decision was made to employ marines from escort carriers in support of amphibious operations, and the first two such carriers were present during the Okinawa campaign in the Spring of 1945. Training and techniques were identical with those employed by Navy squadrons engaged in the same sort of work.

The aircraft used in carrier aviation were of three major types. Designed primarily for combat with enemy aircraft, fighter planes equipped with machine guns, bombs, and rockets were also employed as offensive weapons against ships and land targets. Dive bombers participated in co-ordinated attacks with fighters and torpedo planes and were the most accurate of all bombers. Torpedo planes made torpedo attacks only occasionally and were more often used as versatile light bombers capable of carrying a ton of bombs plus rockets. Because of their inherent characteristics they proved valuable for short-range search and sea patrol particularly against submarines.

Marine Aviation

Marine aviation was organized administratively as part of the Marine Corps. The basic unit was the squadron of 12 to 32 planes, two or more of which constituted a group. Likewise two or more groups with headquarters and service units made up a wing. Although it was originally planned that each division of ground troops should have a supporting wing bearing the same number, the exigencies of war made it impossible to carry out this scheme and Marine aircraft, like all others, were assigned where they were most needed. For logistical and material support, Marine air units depended upon naval commands.

Besides its carrier functions, Marine aviation served ashore both in support of Marine ground troops and as a garrison air force to protect bases and other installations. Although the latter was more properly the task of the Army, the marines took it over because the Army Air Forces, concentrating on the primary strategic objective in Europe, had insufficient planes available for the Pacific theatre. Such a substitution was in accord with the agreement of 1935 between the Army and Navy which specified that when needed each service would operate in lieu of the other. Similarly Marine air units supported Army ground troops on Guadalcanal and in the Philippines. As an extension of its work as a garrison air force, Marine aviation conducted numerous raids on enemy installations at New Britain and in the islands of the Central Pacific to prevent by-passed Japanese garrisons from interfering with Allied communications.

Because of their position as a fleet reserve, the Marines used the same types of aircraft as the Navy and received similar training with increased emphasis on close air support. The assumption of garrison air force duties resulted in the addition to Marine plane types of a two-engined bomber, the Mitchell (Army B-25, Navy PBJ), which was employed for search and interdiction.

Patrol Aviation

Patrol aviation had as its basic function to discover and report the location, nature, and movements of enemy forces. By a natural extension this came to include photographic missions against enemy installations in advance of carrier and amphibious operations. Whenever it was possible and would not interfere with the basic reconnaissance duty, patrol planes attacked enemy shipping. This was especially successful against unescorted surface vessels and submarines. In the Atlantic, and to a lesser degree in the Pacific, anti-submarine warfare became a highly specialized activity that called for intensive training and complicated equipment. Patrol aviation also acquired many other miscellaneous functions including air-sea rescue, minelaying, defensive patrols around surface forces far at sea, and diversionary, harassing attacks against enemy bases and islands.

Prior to the war the Navy depended upon large flying boats for patrol work. All these aircraft were distinguished for range, relatively slow speed, and light armament. Since flying boats could be based upon tenders anchored in harbours, sheltered coves, and open sea, they possessed great mobility and were employed in advance positions before the capture and construction of airfields was possible.

Between 1939 and 1941 the neutrality patrol demonstrated the need for land-based aircraft to operate in northern latitudes during winter weather, and the first months of the war indicated the need for more speed and armament in a plane that was expected to operate singly in close proximity to enemy airfields. Since it was impossible to provide the necessary characteristics in seaplanes, the Navy obtained land types from the Army. Before an Army high altitude bomber could be effectively employed for search and reconnaissance, however, 50 per cent. of its internal arrangements had to be altered and special equipment installed. Because this modification required virtually as many man-hours as the construction of a new plane, the Navy began designing new patrol aircraft to meet its special requirements.

As in other types of naval aviation the basic unit was the squadron. Since the planes usually flew alone and were frequently operated in three- or six-plane detachments from tenders, the squadron remained largely an administrative unit. Squadrons were organized into Fleet Air Wings which also included coastal patrol squadrons and headquarters and

service units. Patrol squadrons were assigned to task groups and forces for operations and since it was common practice to employ wing commanders in the task organization, Fleet Air Wings acquired operational as well as administrative and logistical functions and were closely integrated with other elements of the fleet.

Noncombat Aviation

Created immediately after the outbreak of war in the Pacific, the Naval Air Transport Service adapted the methods of commercial air lines to meet the demands of the Navy's forces, the world over. Its duties included such activities as rapid transport of materials for repair of ships damaged in distant theatres, delivery of medical supplies to forward areas and evacuation of casualties, operation of targets for training.

APPENDIX B

EXTRACTS FROM UNITED STATES—BRITISH STAFF CONVERSATIONS

REPORT

Washington, D.C., 27th March, 1941

Purposes of the Staff Conference

3. The purposes of the Staff Conference, as set out in the instructions to the two representative bodies, were as follows:—

- (a) To determine the best methods by which the armed forces of the United States and British Commonwealth, with its present Allies, could defeat Germany and the Powers allied with her, should the United States be compelled to resort to war.
- (b) To co-ordinate, on broad lines, plans for the employment of the forces of the Associated Powers.
- (c) To reach agreements concerning the methods and nature of military co-operation between the two nations, including the allocation of the principal areas of responsibility, the major lines of the military strategy to be pursued by both nations, the strength of the forces which each may be able to commit, and the determination of satisfactory command arrangements, both as to supreme military control, and as to unity of field command in cases of strategic or tactical joint operations.

Assumptions

7. The term 'Associated Powers' used herein is to be taken as meaning the United States and British Commonwealth, and, when appropriate, includes the Associates and Allies of either Power.

8. The Staff Conference assumes that when the United States becomes involved in war with Germany, it will at the same time engage in war with Italy. In these circumstances, the possibility of a state of war arising between Japan and an association of the United States, the British Commonwealth and its allies, including the Netherlands East Indies, must be taken into account.

Strategic Defence Policies

11. The principles of United States and British defence policies of which the military forces of the Associated Powers must take account are:—

- (a) United States.—The paramount territorial interests of the United States are in the Western Hemisphere. The United States must, in all eventualities, maintain such dispositions as will prevent the extension in the Western Hemisphere of European or Asiatic political or military power.
- (b) British Commonwealth.—The security of the United Kingdom must be maintained in all circumstances. Similarly, the United Kingdom, the Dominions, and India must maintain dispositions which, in all eventualities, will provide for the ultimate security of the British Commonwealth of Nations. A cardinal feature of British strategic policy is the retention of a position in the Far East such as will ensure the cohesion and security of the British Commonwealth and the maintenance of its war effort.
- (c) Sea Communications.—The security of the sea communications of the Associated Powers is essential to the continuance of their war effort.

General Strategic Concept

12. The strategic concept includes the following as the principal offensive policies against the Axis Powers :—

- (d) Even if Japan were not initially to enter the war on the side of the Axis Powers, it would still be necessary for the Associated Powers to deploy their forces in a manner to guard against eventual Japanese intervention. If Japan does enter the war, the military strategy in the Far East will be defensive. The United States does not intend to add to its present military strength in the Far East, but will employ the United States Pacific Fleet offensively in the manner best calculated to weaken Japanese economic power, and to support the defence of the Malay barrier by diverting Japanese strength away from Malaysia. The United States intends so to augment its forces in the Atlantic and Mediterranean areas that the British Commonwealth will be in a position to release the necessary forces for the Far East.

Principles of Command

14. Subject to the provision of Annexes II and III, and to other agreements made between appropriate authorities to meet special conditions, the following principles will govern the exercise of command of the military forces of the Associated Powers :—

- (a) In accordance with plans based on joint strategic policy, each Power will be charged with the strategic direction of all forces of the Associated Powers normally operating in certain areas. The areas are defined initially in Annex II.
- (b) As a general rule, the forces of each of the Associated Powers should operate under their own commanders in the areas of responsibility of their own Power.
- (c) The assignment of an area to one Power shall not be construed as restricting the forces of the other Power from temporarily extending appropriate operations into that area, as may be required by particular circumstances.
- (d) The forces of either Power which are employed normally under the strategic direction of an established commander of the other will, with due regard to their type, be employed as task (organized) forces charged with the execution of specific strategic tasks. These task (organized) forces will operate under their own commanders and will not be distributed into small bodies attached to the forces of the other Power. Only exceptional military circumstances will justify the temporary suspension of the normal strategic tasks.
- (e) When units of both Powers co-operate tactically, command will be exercised by that officer of either Power who is the senior in rank, or if of equal rank, of time in grade.
- (f) United States naval aviation forces employed in British areas will operate under United States naval command, and will remain an integral part of United States naval task forces.

ANNEX II**RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE STRATEGIC DIRECTION OF MILITARY FORCES****United States Areas**

1. Upon entering the war the United States will assume responsibility for the strategic direction of its own and British military forces in the following areas :—

- (b) The Pacific Ocean, together with islands and contiguous continental land areas, as follows :—
- (1) North of latitude 30° North and west of longitude 140° East ;
 - (2) North of the equator and east of longitude 140° East ;
 - (3) South of the equator and east of longitude 180° to the South American coast and longitude 74° West.

The United States will afford support to British naval forces in the regions south of the equator, as far west as longitude 155° East.

The Far East Area

3. Co-ordination in the planning and execution of operations by the military forces of the United States, British Commonwealth, and Netherlands East Indies in the Far East area will, subject to the approval of the Dutch authorities, be effected as follows :—

- (a) The commanders of the military forces of the Associated Powers will collaborate in the formation of strategic plans for operations in the area.
- (b) The defence of the territories of the Associated Powers will be the responsibility of the respective commanders of the military forces concerned. These commanders will make such arrangements for mutual support as may be practicable and appropriate.
- (c) The responsibility for the strategic direction of the naval forces of the Associated Powers, except naval forces engaged in supporting the defence of the Philippines, will be assumed by the British naval Commander-in-Chief, China. The Commander-in-Chief, United States Asiatic Fleet, will be responsible for the direction of naval forces engaged in supporting the defence of the Philippines.
- (d) For the above purposes, the Far East area is defined as the area from the coast of China in latitude 30° North, east to longitude 140° East, thence south to the equator, then east to longitude 141° East, thence south to the boundary of Dutch New Guinea on the south coast, thence westward to latitude 11° South longitude 120° East, thence south to latitude 13° South, thence west to longitude 92° East, thence north to latitude 20° North, thence to the boundary between India and Burma.

Joint Land Offensives

4. Responsibility for the strategic direction of the military forces engaged in joint offensive action on land will be in accordance with joint agreements to be entered upon at the proper time. In these circumstances unity of command in the theatre of operations should be established.

5. The British Commonwealth will assume responsibility for the strategic direction of associated military forces in all other areas not described in paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4 of this Annex II.

ANNEX III**UNITED STATES—BRITISH COMMONWEALTH JOINT BASIC WAR PLAN**

1. This Annex III is the Joint Basic War Plan No. 1 of the United States and the British Commonwealth for war against the Axis Powers. The assumptions and strategic considerations on which this plan is based will be found in paragraph 7 to 13 of the main report.

2. This plan is arranged in the following sections :—

I.—United States Areas

- (b) Pacific (paragraphs 17 to 27).

II.—The Far East Area and the Australia and New Zealand Area (paragraphs 28 to 38).**III.—British Areas**

- (e) India and the East Indies (paragraphs 77 to 80).

3. Uncertainties exist as to the stability of the strategic situations in various theatres, and as to the time of entry into the war of the United States, Japan and the Netherlands East Indies. The strategic deployments, strengths and tasks of the armed forces of the Associated Powers, as herein after listed, must, therefore, be regarded as subject to final decision in the light of the strategical situation at the time when any of these three Powers enter the war.

5. The term 'United States naval forces,' as used herein, will be construed as including United States naval aviation. The term 'air forces' will be construed as including only the United States Army Air Corps and the Royal Air Force.

6. United States naval and British naval, army and air strengths are assigned on the basis of estimated probable strengths on 1st April 1941, unless otherwise indicated. Naval auxiliary, coastal and harbour types, and vessels under extensive repair or refit are omitted. United States Army strengths are those which it is estimated will be available on the dates stated herein. See also Appendix B, 'General Note on the Disposition of British Naval Forces'.

I.—UNITED STATES AREAS

THE PACIFIC

Definition of Area

17. *The Pacific Ocean Area: together with islands and contiguous continental land areas, is as follows :—*

- (a) North of latitude 30° North and west of longitude 140° East.
- (b) North of the equator and east of longitude 140° East.
- (c) South of the equator and east of longitude 180° to the South American coast and longitude 74° West.

NAVAL FORCES

Tasks

18. (a) Support the forces of the Associated Powers in the Far East area by diverting enemy strength away from the Malay Barrier through the denial and capture of positions in the Marshalls, and through raids on enemy sea communications and positions.

(b) Destroy Axis sea communications by capturing or destroying vessels trading directly or indirectly with the enemy.

(c) Protect the sea communications of the Associated Powers within the Pacific Area.

(d) Support British naval forces in the area south of the equator, as far west as longitude 155° East.

United States have no intention of making any permanent allocation of U.S. naval forces to this area. U.S. Pacific Fleet will support British naval forces in Tasmanian Sea as opportunity offers, or as might prove profitable. Such support, however, could not be continuous, nor would it be extended in the case of sporadic raiding by single Axis ships. U.S. Pacific Fleet will, at all times, be employed as seems best with regard to totality of Pacific strategic situation, as it affects the interests of the stipulated Powers. (Tel. Gleam 71. 19/6/41.)

(e) Protect the territory of the Associated Powers within the Pacific area, and prevent the extension of enemy military power into the Western Hemisphere, by destroying hostile expeditions and by supporting land and air forces in denying the enemy the use of land positions in that hemisphere.

(f) Prepare to capture and establish control over the Caroline and Marshall Islands area.

Initial United States Naval Forces

19. (a) Pacific Fleet (based in Hawaii) :—

- 8 battleships.
- 2 aircraft carriers.
- 8 8-inch cruisers.
- 5 6-inch cruisers.
- 3 6-inch cruisers (old).
- 5 destroyers (1,850-ton).
- 40 destroyers.
- 5 minesweepers (destroyer type).
- 19 submarines (3 en route to Atlantic).
- 4 submarines (old).
- 8 minelayers (destroyer type).
- 1 minelayer.
- 84 patrol type seaplanes.

(b) Atlantic reinforcement (available for Pacific operations until transferred*).

- 3 battleships.
- 1 aircraft carrier.
- 4 8-inch cruisers.
- 4 6-inch cruisers.
- 6 destroyers (1,850-ton).
- 8 destroyers.

* As soon as the situation in the Pacific permits their transfer to the Atlantic.

(c) South-east Pacific Force (based in Canal Zone) :—

- 2 6-inch cruisers (old).
- 4 destroyers.

(d) Fleet Marine Force (based on San Diego) :—

- 1 Infantry Division (7,500 troops).
- 1 Defence Battalion (900 troops).
- 1 Aircraft Group (63 planes).

(e) Coastal Frontiers :—

- Pacific—
 - 9 destroyers (old).
 - 2 submarines.
 - 24 patrol type seaplanes.
- Hawaii—
 - 4 destroyers (old).

20. There will be no British naval forces in this area other than local naval defence craft on the Canadian seaboard.

Estimated United States Naval Reinforcements by 1st July, 1941

21. (a) Pacific Fleet :—

- 1 battleship.
- 1 aircraft carrier.
- 10 submarines.
- 1 submarine minelayer.

LAND FORCES

Tasks

22. In conjunction with the naval and air forces in the area :—

- (a) Hold Oahu as a main outlying naval base.
- (b) Defend the Panama Canal, the Pacific Coast of the United States and Canada, and Alaska, including Kodiak and Unalaska.
- (c) Support Latin American Republics on the west coast of South America

AIR FORCES

Tasks

25. (a) Support the land and naval forces in the defence of Oahu, the Panama Canal, the Pacific Coast of the United States, Canada, and Alaska, and in the support of Latin American Republics on the west coast of South America by providing for the air defence of vital installations, by destroying enemy expeditionary forces, and by denying use by the enemy or forces supporting the enemy of existing or potential air, land, and naval bases.

(b) Support the naval forces in the protection of the sea communications of the Associated Powers and in the destruction of Axis sea communications by offensive action against enemy forces or commerce located within tactical operating radius of occupied air bases.

II.—THE FAR EAST AREA AND THE AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND AREA

Definition of Far East Area

28. The Far East area is defined as the area bounded by lines from the coast of China in latitude 30° North, east to longitude 140° East, thence south to the equator, thence east to longitude 141° East, thence south to the boundary of Dutch New Guinea on the south coast, thence westward to latitude 11° South, longitude 120° East, thence south to latitude 13° South, thence west to longitude 92° East, thence north to latitude 20° North, thence to the boundary between India and Burma.

Definition of Australia and New Zealand Area

29. The Australia and New Zealand area comprises the Australian and New Zealand British Naval Stations west of longitude 180 degrees and south of the equator. The limits of these stations are defined in Appendix A.

Special Command Relationships

30. The defence of the territories of the Associated Powers in the Far East area will be the responsibility of the respective commanders of the military forces concerned. These commanders will make such arrangements for mutual support as may be practicable and appropriate.

31. In the Far East area the responsibility for the strategic direction of the naval forces of the Associated Powers, except of naval forces engaged in supporting the defence of the Philippines, will be assumed by the British Naval Commander-in-Chief, China. The Commander-in-Chief, United States Asiatic Fleet, will be responsible for the direction of naval forces engaged in supporting the defence of the Philippines.

32. The British Naval Commander-in-Chief, China, is also charged with responsibility for the strategic direction of the naval forces of the Associated Powers operating in the Australia and New Zealand area as defined in paragraph 29.

NAVAL FORCES

Tasks in the Far East Area

33. (a) Raid Japanese sea communications and destroy Axis forces.
 (b) Support the land and air forces in the defence of the territories of the Associated Powers. (The responsibility of the Commander-in-Chief, United States Asiatic Fleet, for supporting the defence of the Philippines remains as long as that defence continues.)
 (c) Destroy Axis sea communications by capturing or destroying vessels trading directly or indirectly with the enemy.
 (d) Protect sea communications of the Associated Powers by escorting, covering and patrolling, and by destroying enemy raiding forces.

Tasks in the Australia and New Zealand Area

34. The tasks of the naval forces in the Australia and New Zealand area are the same as those for the Far East area.

Far East Area

United States Asiatic Fleet :—

- 1 8-inch cruiser.
- 1 6-inch cruiser.
- 13 destroyers (old).
- 11 submarines.
- 6 submarines (old).
- 24 patrol type seaplanes.

Netherlands Forces :—

- 2 6-inch cruisers.
- 6 destroyers.
- 11 submarines.
- 4 submarines (old).
- 27 patrol type seaplanes (plus 12)*.
- 2 sloops.

* Crews not yet trained.

Far East Area and Australia and New Zealand Area

British forces available for operations in these areas and the British reinforcements which may be sent :—

Types of Ships	British and			
	Dominion Forces		Immediate British Reinforcements	Ultimate British Reinforcements
	I	II	III	IV
Battleships	—	—	5(a)
Battle cruisers	—	1(b)	—
Aircraft carriers	—	1(b)	—
8-inch cruisers	1	1(c)	2(d)
6-inch cruisers	3	3(c)	5(d)
6-inch cruisers (old)	4	—	4
Armed merchant cruisers	3	—	—
Destroyers	—	5(c)	27(e)
Destroyers (old)	5	—	—
Flying-boats	9	—	—
Sloops	1	—	—

- (a) Three from Halifax Force, one from Force H, one from vessels unallocated.
 (b) From Force H.
 (c) From Force H and other areas.
 (d) Probably from Home Fleet and new construction.
 (e) From North Atlantic Command and other unallocated vessels.

LAND AND AIR FORCES

36. **Tasks** (as proposed by Tel. Gleam 163 and confirmed in Admiralty Message 1556A/1/12/41.

- (a) Defend Hong Kong, Philippines, the Netherlands East Indies and such other territory and islands as it may be decided from time to time to occupy as bases or which contribute to defence of areas listed in paragraph 36.
 (b) Hold Luzon, Malaya, Singapore and Java against Japanese attack.
 (c) Support of naval forces of Associated Powers in protection of sea communications and in attack on Axis forces and positions.
 (d) Conduct air raids against Japanese forces and installations within tactical operating radius of available forces.

Australia and New Zealand Area

- (e) In conjunction with naval and air forces protect British territory and prevent extension of enemy military power in this area.
 (f) Support of Naval forces of Associated Powers in protection of sea communications and in attack on Axis forces and positions.
 (g) Conduct air raids against Japanese forces and installations within tactical operating radius of available bases.

Strength of Air Forces on 1st April 1941

38. Philippines—One composite group consisting of :—

- 1 bombardment squadron.
- 3 pursuit squadrons.

Netherlands East Indies :—

- 9 bomber squadrons.
- 2 fighter squadrons.
- 1 bomber reconnaissance squadron.
- 27 (plus 12) patrol type seaplanes (as shown in paragraph 35).

Malaya :—

- 5 medium bomber squadrons.
- 1 fighter bomber squadron.
- 1 fighter squadron.
- 2 torpedo bomber squadrons.
- 1 general reconnaissance squadron.
- 1 general reconnaissance flying-boat squadron.

Note.—A programme of reinforcement of British air strength for Malaya, which will bring the total number of aircraft in Malaya to 336 (*i.e.*, 22 squadrons), is being carried out gradually as the situation elsewhere permits.

Australia :—

- 6 general reconnaissance squadrons.
- 4 general purpose squadrons.
- 2 army co-operation squadrons.
- 1 flying boat squadron.

New Zealand :—

- 3 general reconnaissance squadrons.

III.—BRITISH AREAS

INDIA AND EAST INDIES

Definition of Area

77. (a) India.

(b) Indian Ocean, including the Red Sea and Persian Gulf, bounded on the west by the coasts of Africa and longitude 33° East, and on the east by the western boundaries of the Far East area and the Australia Station.

(c) The islands in the above area.

NAVAL FORCES

Tasks

78. (a) Protect sea communications of the Associated Powers by escorting, covering and patrolling, and by destroying enemy raiding forces.

(b) Destroy Axis sea communications by capturing or destroying vessels trading directly or indirectly with the enemy.

(c) Conduct offensive operations against Axis territory in the Red Sea.

British Commonwealth Naval Forces

79.

1 8-inch cruiser.

*5 6-inch cruisers (old).

1 A.A. cruiser.

5 armed merchant cruisers.

3 destroyers.

12 sloops.

1 submarine (ex-Italian).

* One returns to Far East if Japan enters the war.

LAND AND AIR FORCES

80. The task of the land and air forces is the defence of India and of the islands in the area. . . .

GENERAL

81. In view of the fact that a considerable number of British Commonwealth naval forces are undergoing repair, and new vessels are continually coming forward from construction, it is not practicable to present here the complete distribution of all naval forces of the British Commonwealth.

APPENDIX C
JAPANESE FLEET READINESS

1931-45 (Includes Fleet units completed prior to 1931 and annual additions) fiscal years (April-March)

	1931				1932				1933				1934				1935			
	Serviceable	Need repair	Modernizing	Total	Serviceable	Need repair	Modernizing	Total	Serviceable	Need repair	Modernizing	Total	Serviceable	Need repair	Modernizing	Total	Serviceable	Need repair	Modernizing	Total
Battleships	7	1	2	10	5	2	3	10	6	3	1	10	7	2	1	10	6	2	2	10
Carriers	5	—	—	5	4	1	—	5	5	—	—	5	4	2	—	6	5	1	—	6
Cruisers	21	4	—	25	21	5	—	26	23	6	—	29	25	3	1	29	23	5	1	29
Destroyers	57	—	—	57	68	—	—	68	62	8	—	70	60	7	—	67	62	9	—	71
Submarines	35	—	—	35	35	—	—	35	34	4	—	38	36	2	—	38	17	22	—	39
Minesweepers	3	—	—	3	3	—	—	3	4	—	—	4	4	—	—	4	4	—	—	4
Subchasers	6	—	—	6	6	—	—	6	6	—	—	6	8	—	—	8	10	—	—	10
Coast defence	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	—	—	2	2	—	—	2
Gunboats	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Torpedo boats	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	3	—	—	3	4	—	—	4

	1936				1937				1938				1939				1940				1941				1942				1943				1944				1945			
	Serviceable	Need repair	Modernizing	Total	Serviceable	Need repair	Modernizing	Total	Serviceable	Need repair	Modernizing	Total	Serviceable	Need repair	Modernizing	Total	Serviceable	Need repair	Modernizing	Total	Serviceable	Need repair	Modernizing	Total	Serviceable	Need repair	Modernizing	Total	Serviceable	Need repair	Modernizing	Total	Serviceable	Need repair	Modernizing	Total				
Battleships	5	3	2	10	6	3	1	10	5	4	1	10	7	2	1	10	8	—	—	8	7	2	2	11	9	—	—	—	9	2	—	—	2	2	—	—	2			
Carriers	5	1	—	6	4	—	2	6	5	—	2	7	4	2	2	8	4	—	—	4	4	2	2	8	4	—	—	—	4	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—			
Cruisers	18	6	7	31	17	4	10	31	20	5	8	33	15	4	15	15	4	4	4	15	15	4	23	15	—	—	—	15	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—			
Destroyers	62	10	—	72	68	8	—	76	76	7	5	88	75	15	—	90	84	12	—	96	84	12	12	100	84	—	—	—	100	84	—	—	—	—	—	—	—			
Submarines	22	22	—	44	38	9	—	47	42	6	—	48	42	9	—	51	40	12	—	62	40	12	12	52	40	—	—	—	52	40	—	—	—	—	—	—				
Minesweepers	4	—	—	4	5	—	—	5	5	—	—	5	5	—	—	5	6	—	—	11	5	—	16	6	—	—	—	11	6	—	—	—	—	—	—	—				
Minesweepers	11	—	—	11	12	—	—	12	12	—	—	12	16	—	—	16	12	—	—	28	12	—	16	12	12	—	—	—	12	12	—	—	—	—	—	—				
Subchasers	2	—	—	2	3	—	—	3	3	—	—	3	3	—	—	3	8	—	—	11	3	—	8	12	—	—	—	11	12	—	—	—	—	—	—	—				
Coast defence	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—				
Gunboats	—	—	—	—	9	—	—	9	9	—	—	9	9	—	—	9	8	—	—	17	9	—	8	10	8	—	—	—	10	10	—	—	—	—	—	—				
Torpedo boats	4	—	—	4	8	—	—	8	12	—	—	12	12	—	—	12	12	—	—	24	12	—	12	12	12	—	—	—	12	12	—	—	—	—	—	—				

	1941				1942				1943				1944				1945			
	Serviceable	Need repair	Modernizing	Total	Serviceable	Need repair	Modernizing	Total	Serviceable	Need repair	Modernizing	Total	Serviceable	Need repair	Modernizing	Total	Serviceable	Need repair	Modernizing	Total
Battleships	10	—	—	10	11	—	—	11	9	—	—	9	9	—	—	9	2	—	—	2
Carriers	10	—	—	10	16	—	—	16	11	2	—	13	15	—	—	15	3	—	—	3
Cruisers	37	—	—	37	38	—	—	38	34	—	—	34	29	—	—	29	5	—	—	5
Destroyers	109	1	—	110	107	1	—	108	90	3	—	93	64	—	—	64	31	—	—	31
Submarines	63	—	—	63	60	—	—	60	58	2	—	60	55*	—	—	55*	8	—	—	8
Minesweepers	8	—	—	8	9	—	—	9	8	—	—	8	8	—	—	8	3	—	—	3
Minesweepers	18	—	—	18	9	—	—	9	15	—	—	15	8	—	—	8	17	—	—	17
Subchasers	15	—	—	15	15	—	—	15	22	—	—	22	21	—	—	21	10	—	—	10
Coast defence	—	—	—	—	4	—	—	4	7	—	—	7	7	—	—	7	30	—	—	30
Gunboats	11	—	—	11	13	—	—	13	16	—	—	16	15	—	—	15	6	—	—	6
Torpedo boats	15	—	—	15	15	—	—	15	11	—	—	11	10	—	—	10	2	—	—	2

*Including transport, coast defence and other special types. Not all in commission

APPENDIX D
JAPANESE MILITARY POTENTIAL

Note.—The figures given here are taken from the best sources available, and although the accuracy cannot be guaranteed it is believed they present a reliable general picture
TABLE 1 Annual Requirements and Supply of Principal Raw Materials
 Note.—Only those materials are included of which Japan found difficulty in maintaining adequate supplies

Material	Unit of Quantity	Total Requirements	Supply							Remarks			
			Domestic Production	Potential Supply				Stockpile reclaimed	Prospective Supply				
				Manchuria	China	French Indo-China	Thailand		Total		Dutch Indies	Philippines	British possessions
Iron ore	Metric tons ¹	10,000,000	3,950,000	2,700,000	70,000 (100,000) ²	—	—	7,002,000	3,300,000	—	2,000,000	1,400,000	Although shipping is lacking in wartime, 4,000,000 metric tons of steel can be supplied.
Manganese ore	Metric tons	300,000	200,000	—	—	—	—	200,000	250,000	27,000	30,000	32,000	Increase production and economize in consumption.
Copper	Metric tons	200,000	80,000	—	—	—	—	80,000	70,000 (77,000)	—	200,000	—	Limit use; reclaim; secure Philippine supply. ⁸
Nickel ore	Metric tons	1,250,000 ³	—	—	—	—	—	60,000 [sic]	60,000	—	—	—	Economize in nickel consumption; secure Celebes source of supply.
Lead	Metric tons	170,000	28,000	1,200	—	—	—	29,200	32,000	—	—	2,500	Limit use; increase domestic and Manchurian production.
Zinc	Metric tons	80,000	70,000	3,000	—	600	—	79,000	3,000	—	—	100,000 ⁴	—
Tin	Metric tons	12,300	2,000	—	300 (500)	8,200 (15,000)	—	10,500	3,000	5,000 (10,000)	—	500 (1,500)	Figures in parentheses represent production.
Bauxite	Metric tons	480,000	50,000	—	—	—	—	50,000	330,000	350,000	—	100,000	—
Crude rubber	Metric tons	65,000	—	—	40,000 (80,000)	25,000 (40,000)	—	65,000	70,000	(400,000)	(1,000)	(400,000)	Figures in parentheses represent production.
Industrial salt	Metric tons	1,500,000	150,000	800,000	80,000 (250,000) ⁵	—	—	1,500,000	100,000 ⁶	150,000	—	—	—
Rice	1,000 koku ⁷	100,000	94,000	—	4,000	2,000	—	100,000	—	—	—	—	—

¹Metric ton = 1,016 long ton of 2,240 lb.

²Parentthesized 100,000 not explained.

³First digit blurred. Actual average imports 1940-1943 inclusive were 30,785 tons of concentrates, equivalent to approximately 770,000 tons of ore.

⁴Ore.—In the event domestic production sufficed and little zinc was imported; even the large stock of concentrates left by the British in Burma remained almost untouched.

⁵Second digit not clear. Possibly 250,000.

⁶Possibly 110,000.

⁷1 koku = 4.96 bushels.

⁸Actually, the exploitation of the Philippines mines was disappointing, and the peak year, 1943, produced only 7,000 tons of copper imports. By increasing domestic production and the use of substitutes Japan managed with difficulty to make good.

(Based on Japanese document reproduced in *Japan's Struggle to end the War*.)

TABLE 2

Petroleum (Unit = 1,000 barrels)

Calendar year	Refined imported	Refined from crude	Refined from synthetic plants	Substitute fuels (alcohol, benzol, etc.)	Total imported and reefined	Consumption	N.E.I. output consumed in the South	United States production (crude)
1942	2,061	13,851	1,361	1,270	18,543	25,549	15,415 ¹	1,386,645
1943	3,975	14,903	1,076	1,175	21,129	28,109	31,591	1,503,176
1944	4,071	9,079	1,113	968	15,221	22,286	34,682	1,678,000
1945 (9 months)	761	2,344	335	981	4,421	8,259	6,816 ²	1,711,103

¹Fiscal year.²Three months.

TABLE 3

Iron and Steel
(Unit = 1,000 long tons of 2,240 lb.)

JAPAN

UNITED STATES

Fiscal year	Pig iron imports	Scrap (all sources)	Stock pile of scrap	Ingot steel production ¹	Calendar year	Pig iron production	Steel ingots and castings production ³
1940	868	4,395	5,803	7,278	1940	42,320	59,806
1941	796	3,295	4,539	7,688	1941	50,613	73,964
1942	892	3,462	3,057	8,132	1942	54,378	76,814
1943	1,152	3,671	1,460	8,979	1943	56,045	79,318
1944	957	3,207	456	6,607	1944	56,130	80,037
1945	52 ²	434	313		1945	49,034	71,162

¹Including Korea and Manchukuo.²April-June.³Figures include only that portion of steel castings production which was produced in foundries operated by companies producing ingot steel.

TABLE 4

Aluminium
(Metric tons)

Allocation of Primary Aluminium

Fiscal year	Imports of bauxite ¹	Shale ²	Aircraft	Army	Navy	Civilian
1942	450,134	47,358	66,214	14,854	5,892	19,950
1943	820,534	50,499	107,290	11,328	7,053	11,470
1944	347,335	147,411	99,038	3,635	3,755	—
1945 (April-June)		37,614	6,500	—	—	—

¹ Including imports into Formosa.² Including imports into Korea.

TABLE 5

Coal
(Unit = 1,000 long tons)

JAPAN

Fiscal year	Production	Imports	Total	Calendar year	UNITED STATES PRODUCTION	BRITISH PRODUCTION
1942	55,065	8,888	63,953	1942	574,125	203,633
1943	56,427	6,125	62,552	1943	580,077	194,493
1944	50,124	3,185	53,309	1944	610,069	184,098
1945		191 ¹		1945	563,333	174,200

¹ April-June.

TABLE 6

Japan—Railway Transport Capacity
(Unit = 1,000 short tons of 2,000 lb.)

Fiscal year	1941	1942	1943	1944	1945 (projected)
.. .. .	150,000	160,000	180,000	190,000	90,000

TABLE 7
Shipping
(Unit = 1,000 G.R.T.)

JAPAN			UNITED STATES	
Date	Available ¹	Date	Available	
December 1941 ..	6,000	1st January 1942	11,000	
December 1942 ..	6,000		Built	
December 1943 ..	5,000	1st January 1942 to 1st January 1945	43,672	
July 1944	3,100			
April 1945	2,000			

¹ Including ships under repair.

TABLE 8
Japanese Aircraft Production by Types

Note.—Engine production failed to keep up in the spring of 1944, and from April 1944 on, engine supply was a bottleneck in the aircraft programme. The position steadily deteriorated after June 1944 and became hopeless after the B.29 raids began in November 1944.

Type	Calendar year				
	1941	1942	1943	1944	1945 (to 15th Aug.)
Fighter	1,080	2,935	7,147	13,811	5,474
Bomber	1,461	2,433	4,189	5,100	1,934
R/C	639	967	2,070	2,147	855
Trainer	1,489	2,171	2,871	6,147	2,523
Other ¹	419	355	416	975	280
Total	5,088	8,861	16,693	28,180	11,066

¹ Includes flying boats, transports, gliders and suicide aircraft.

Source: Air Ordnance Bureau, U.S. Munitions Ministry (quoted in *The Effects of Strategic Bombing on Japan's War Economy*).

APPENDIX E

JAPANESE OPERATIONAL PLAN FOR COMMENCING HOSTILITIES

In November 1941 the following agreement was made between the Japanese Navy and Army.¹

I. Object

Reduction of the primary foundations of U.S., British and Dutch power in Eastern Asia; occupation of the Southern Areas.

Scope of the Operation

The Philippine Islands, Guam, Hong Kong, British Malaya, Burma, the Bismarck Islands, Java, Sumatra, Borneo, Celebes, Timor.

¹ Based on a translation of the 'Central Agreement between Japanese Navy and Army Established in November 1941' reproduced in *The Campaigns of the Pacific War*.

II. The Operational Plan

The Operational Plan for Phase I provided for attack on the United States Fleet at Pearl Harbour. Simultaneously there was to be invasion of Malaya and an air strike on the Philippines, followed by invasions of the Philippines, the Netherlands East Indies and South-East Asia, as follows:—

A. The initiative was to be seized with a sudden attack on the Philippines preceded by an air strike, and a surprise assault and landing in Malaya. Both areas to be occupied. These operations to be completed quickly.

B. During the opening period of operations, key points in Guam, Hong Kong and British Borneo to be occupied, and Siam and Indo-China to be 'stabilized.'

C. Whilst the above operations were in progress, key points were to be occupied in the Bismarck Archipelago, Dutch Borneo, the Celebes, and South Sumatra, depending on the progress of the operations against Malaya, and preparations made to invade Java.

D. During or after the above, strategic positions were to be occupied in the Moluccas and Timor.

E. Java was to be invaded after neutralization from the air and North Sumatra occupied after the capture of Singapore.

F. If the movements of the main United States forces compelled the Combined Fleet to be used to operate against it, or if war should break out with Russia, the Philippines and Malaya operations were to proceed without interruption.

G. In amphibious operations landings were to be made before enemy opposition can be assembled.

H. Plan to be adopted if the British forestalled Japan and invaded South Siam:—

Immediate counter-invasion of Siam by land and sea, Bangkok and an air base to the south to be secured. After the Advance Force had left its rendezvous the procedure was to be according to schedule. Before departure air operations were to be accelerated whilst the landing of the Main Force would be delayed; the landing in force would then be made. Part of a large Navy air unit would be diverted from the Philippines area.

I. In event of British or American attack whilst preparations for operations were in progress, local forces were to be used to intercept, and air offensive to be opened against attacking army forces, in other respects the predetermined plans were to be adhered to.

III. Opening of Operations

X-day, the day of commencing operations, to be determined by Imperial Command.

On X-day the assault and landings in Malaya (after preliminary air attack depending on the situation) and commencement of air attacks on the Philippines. In the event of bad weather the Philippines landings to be postponed, but every effort to be made to carry out the Malaya assault and landings. After the latter and after the first strike against the United States (at Pearl Harbour) the attacks on Hong Kong and Guam to be set in motion.

If the enemy makes a serious attack before X-day in order to seize the initiative, operations will not begin until Imperial Command has been received.

IV. Outline of Operations (See Plan 1)**A. Philippine Operations**

1. Army and Navy air forces to launch the initial air attack from Formosa and Palau. Naval forces to maintain Batan Island (Luzon Strait) as an emergency landing ground for the attacking air forces.

2. Advance units leave rendezvous (see below) on X-1 day. Landings to be made at Aparri (North Luzon), Vigan (N.W. Luzon), Laoag (West Luzon), Legaspi (S.E. Luzon), and Davao (S.E. Mindanao), then occupy Jolo Island (Sulu Archipelago) as rapidly as possible. Naval forces to garrison.

3. Until approximately X+14. Main strength of 14th Army to Lingayen (West Luzon) an element to land on Ramon;¹ occupation of Manila. Cover to be provided by force detailed from 3rd Fleet.

4. After the main Army forces have landed, one brigade to mop up Luzon and 48th Division to secure Manila.

¹ ? Lamon Bay, East Luzon, intended.

B. Malaya Operations

Nucleus force 25th Army, 3rd Air Army, and Expeditionary Fleet. Plan A. Advance Force to assault and land at the following points on the west coast of the Gulf of Siam: Bandon, Nakon (? Lakon), Singora (Songkhla), Patani, and Kota Bharu, and form bases.

Army-Navy air forces to launch initial air attack from south French-Indo-China against enemy air power, ships and small craft. Plan B. (To be adopted if difficulty is anticipated in effecting the landings. Decision will be made by Imperial Headquarters before Advance Force leaves rendezvous.)

1. Advance Force will attempt raids and landings in small numbers launched from the west coast of French-Indo-China. The main strength of the Advance Force will begin to land after X+1.

2. Landing to be made by Advance Force on Kota Bharu as soon as possible after the first landings or with a small number of troops simultaneously with the main strength of the Advance Force.

3. On the return of an element of 14th Army's escort ships (from Lingayen landing) the main strength of the 25th Army will land at Singapore from Southern Siam, subsequently, if opportunity occurs, endeavouring to disembark one group (*Heidan*) on the east coast of Southern Malaya.

C. British Borneo Operations

Surprise attack to be launched on Miri by a force directly attached to the Southern Army, followed by occupation of Kuching. Bases to be maintained. Navy Air Force to support the operation.

D. Capture of Hong Kong

Nuclear Force—one group of 23rd Army, and 2nd China Fleet.

Completely destroy all local enemy shipping, assault enemy positions on the Kowloon Peninsula and occupy Hong Kong. After completion of the operation the group employed will be re-assembled and used to occupy the Netherlands East Indies.

E. Guam and Bismarcks Operations

Nuclear Force of South Seas Detachment and 4th Fleet will seize Guam; combat unit to land and take over garrison duty. Occupy Rabaul; combat unit to land for garrison duty.

F. Netherlands East Indies Operation

Java.—To occupy Batavia, Bandung, Surabaya: main strength of 16th Army in Batavia-Bandung area; one group diverted to Surabaya.

Element of 16th Army to Tarakan, Balikpapan, Banjarmasin (Borneo), Ambon (Celebes), Kupang (Timor). (Navy to relieve Tarakan and Ambon as garrison.)

Navy to Menado (North Celebes) and Makasar.

Elements of 16th Army to key points on Banka Island and Palembang (Sumatra).

Elements of 25th Army to land on Madang (? Medan intended) and occupy Achie (probably Achin) and then Sabang (North Sumatra).

G. Siam and Burma Operations

Element of 15th Army (main strength detailed from 25th Army) to South French-Indo-China, South Siam, Victoria Point (South Burma).

Main Force of 15th Army to Bangkok neighbourhood, one group by land route from French-Indo-China, one group from North China, approximately X+40. Depending on the arrival of the Main Force of 15th Army, an element of the 25th Army will advance to the Main Force's area.

An element of the 15th Army to occupy Moulmein.

V. Command

Army and Navy to co-operate. In local land operations there will be a consolidated command if circumstances render this desirable.

VI. Transport

	Operation				Assembly Point
Guam					Ogasawara
Philippines—					
Advance Unit ..	N. Luzon ..				Pescadores or Takao
	Davao, Legaspi				Palau
Main Force ..	Lingayen ..				Pescadores
	Lamon Bay ..				Nansei Shoto
British Malaya—					
Advance Force ..					Hainan Island
Main Force ..					Formosa, Canton, Hainan, South French-Indo-China.
British Borneo ..					Kam Ranh Bay
Netherlands East Indies—					
Borneo and Moluccas ..					Palau
Sumatra					Hong Kong
East Java					Luzon, Jolo
West Java					Hainan, Formosa

VII. Opening of Operation

Opening of Operation to be stated in Tokyo time (Z-9). Local zone date and time to be used in operations.

VIII. Set-up of Joint Command

Southern Army—Combined Fleet, 2nd Fleet.

Southern Army—Expeditionary Fleet.

14th and 16th Armies—3rd Fleet.

15th and 25th Armies—Expeditionary Fleet.

3rd and 5th F.B. (? forward bases)—11th Air Fleet.

3rd F.B.—Expeditionary Fleet and 22nd Air Flotilla.

South Seas Detachment—4th Fleet.

China Expeditionary Army—China Seas Fleet.

23rd Army—2nd China Fleet.

IX. Operation Designations

Southern Operations in general	A
Philippines	M
Malaya	G
Netherlands East Indies	H
Guam	G
British Borneo	B
Hong Kong	C
Bismarcks	R

APPENDIX F

COURSE OF ACTION OF JAPANESE NAVY IN OPERATIONS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES, GREAT BRITAIN, AND THE NETHERLANDS¹

In November 1941 the following course of action was drawn up for the Japanese Navy.

I. Outline of Operations

Continue control over coast of China and Yangtze River.

Rapid destruction of enemy fleet and air power in East Asia.

Seize and hold strategic points in the Southern Area.

Destroy the enemy fleet at Hawaii.

Consolidate strength for a long period of defensive operations.

Destroy enemy will to fight.

II. Combined Fleet Operations*(a) General Operations*

1. With Second Fleet, Third Fleet, Combined Expeditionary Fleet and Eleventh Air Fleet (land-based Air Force in Formosa and Saigon, total 478 aircraft) as nucleus destroy enemy naval forces in the Philippines, British Malaya and Netherlands East Indies.

¹ Based on translation in *The Campaigns of the Pacific War*, Appendix 13.

Order of Operations.—First occupy British Borneo, then as rapidly as possible Dutch Borneo, Celebes, Southern Sumatra, followed by Molucca Islands and Timor. Air bases to be established in all the above areas and to be used to subjugate and occupy Java. After capture of Singapore, occupy Northern Sumatra and attack Burma at an opportune time. Cut supply routes to China.

2. Fourth Fleet. Defend the South Seas Islands, patrol, maintain surface communications, capture Wake. At opportune moment attack and destroy enemy advanced bases in South Pacific area. In co-operation with Army capture Guam and then Bismarcks area.

3. Fifth Fleet. Patrol area east of Home Islands. Prepare against *surprise attacks by enemy. Reconnoitre Aleutians and defend Ogasawara Gunto.* Maintain surface communications. Be on guard against Russia.

4. Sixth Fleet (submarines). Reconnoitre U.S. Fleet at Hawaii and West Coast of United States. Operate against shipping on lines of communication.

5. First Air Fleet (carriers). Attack enemy fleet at Hawaii and afterwards support Fourth Fleet operations and assist in capture of Southern Areas.

6. Main body of Combined Fleet. Support operations in general.

7. Part of Combined Fleet. Destroy enemy lines of communication in the Pacific and Indian Oceans.

(b) *Second Phase of Operations*

1. Sixth Fleet (submarines). Reconnoitre and attack main enemy fleet. Co-operate with part of Combined Fleet in attacks on enemy lines of communication. Attack enemy advanced bases as opportunity offers.

2. First and Eleventh Air Fleets (carriers and land-based bombers). Search for and attack enemy forces. Destroy enemy advanced bases.

3. Third Fleet, Expeditionary Fleet and other forces as requisite. Defend occupied points in Southern Area, attack and destroy enemy advanced bases on Japanese perimeter.

4. Fourth Fleet. Defend and patrol points in South Sea Islands and Bismarcks. Maintain surface communications. Search for and attack enemy shipping. Attack and destroy enemy bases on Japanese perimeter.

5. Fifth Fleet. Defend Ogasawara and patrol area to north of those islands and east of home islands. Maintain surface communications. Search for and attack enemy fleet if it should enter the area. Attack and destroy enemy bases in the Aleutians.

6. Part of Combined Fleet. Destroy enemy surface communications in Pacific and Indian Oceans.

7. Main body of Combined Fleet. Support all operations, operating as required.

8. In case of attack by strong American force maintain contact with part of Sixth Fleet. Reduce enemy strength by air and submarine attacks. Major portion of Combined Fleet to concentrate at suitable opportunity and destroy enemy.

9. In case of attack by strong British force. Third, Fourth and Expeditionary Fleets, air force, and submarine squadrons maintain contact with enemy and destroy his force by concerted attack. Main body of Combined Fleet, depending on condition and position of U.S. Fleet, will also be used to destroy British Fleet.

10. Important points to be defended amongst those occupied: Manila,¹ Hong Kong, Davao, Singapore,¹ Batavia, Surabaya,¹ Tarakan, Balikpapan, Manado, Makasar, Ambon, Penang, Rabaul.

III. China Area Fleet Operations

Continue operations against China. Co-operate with Army in destruction of U.S. and British forces in China. Second China Fleet co-operate with Army in capture of Hong Kong. Maintain surface communications along coast of China and deny use of coast to enemy. Co-operate with Combined Fleet and Army in operations (escort of surface transport and defence of assembly points).

IV. Operations of Naval District and Auxiliary Naval Station Forces

Defend areas to which detailed and maintain surface communications. Co-operate with Combined Fleet and China Area Fleet in operations affecting own areas.

¹ Indicates advanced base.

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